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Forensic Science: 
Daubert’s Failure 
Paul C. Giannelli† 
“The man who discovers a new scientific truth has previously 
had to smash to atoms almost everything he had learnt, and 
arrives at the new truth with hands bloodstained from the 
slaughter of a thousand platitudes.”1 
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Introduction 
In 2015, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted that “[m]any defendants have been convicted and spent countless 
years in prison based on evidence by arson experts who were later 
shown to be little better than witch doctors.”2 In the same year, Dr. Jo 
Handelsman, a White House science advisor, observed: “Suggesting that 
bite marks [should] still be a seriously used technology is not based on 
science, on measurement, on something that has standards, but more 
of a gut-level reaction.”3 According to Judge Catharine Easterly of the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, “[a]s matters currently stand, a certainty 
statement regarding toolmark pattern matching has the same probative 
value as the vision of a psychic.”4 A New York Times editorial echoed 
these sentiments: 
[C]ourts have only made the problem worse by purporting to be 
scientifically literate, and allowing in all kinds of evidence that 
 
2. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. 
Proc. iii, v (2015); see also Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, 
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (Rakoff, J.) (“There have 
been too many pseudo-scientific disciplines that have since been exposed as 
profoundly flawed, unreliable, or baseless for any Court to take this 
[gatekeeping] role lightly.”). 
3. See Radley Balko, A High-Ranking Obama Official Just Called for the 
“Eradication” of Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (July 22, 2015), https: 
//www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/07/22/a-high-ranking 
-obama-official-just-called-for-the-eradication-of-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_ 
term=.449f38b65769 [https://perma.cc/F9ES-B79J] (quoting Handelsman’s 
remarks presented at the International Symposium on Forensic Science Error 
Management: Detection, Measurement and Mitigation, Arlington, Virginia 
(July 20–24, 2015), organized by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)). 
4. Williams v. United States, 130 A.3d 343, 355 (D.C. 2016) (Easterly, J., 
concurring). 
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would not make it within shouting distance of a peer-reviewed 
journal. Of the 329 exonerations based on DNA testing since 1989, 
more than one-quarter involved convictions based on “pattern” 
evidence—like hair samples, ballistics, tire tracks, and bite 
marks—testified to by so-called experts.5 
These criticisms are valid—which raises a puzzling and 
consequential question: Why didn’t the Supreme Court’s “junk science” 
decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 prevent or 
restrict the admissibility of testimony based on flawed forensic 
techniques? After all, Daubert was decided in 1993, twenty-five years 
ago. 
A. Daubert and Rule 702 
Daubert was considered a revolutionary decision.7 It “radically 
changed the standard for admissibility of scientific testimony”8 by 
sweeping away the Frye v. United States9 “general acceptance” test,10 
which had been the majority rule in both federal and state cases.11 The 
Frye standard gave great deference to the views of forensic practitioners 
and not to empirical testing.12 Daubert promised to be different. The 
Supreme Court held that “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by 
 
5. Editorial, Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2015), https: 
//www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/junk-science-at-the-fbi.html [https: 
//perma.cc/6PH3-8SPL]; see also Eric S. Lander, Fix the Flaws in Forensic 
Science, N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/21/opinion/fix-the-flaws-in-forensic-science.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8LPZ-BWHX] (“No expert should be permitted to testify without showing 
three things: a public database of patterns from many representative 
samples; precise and objective criteria for declaring matches; and peer-
reviewed published studies that validate the methods.”). 
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
7. See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 Sci. 339, 340 
(2002) (“Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the law.”). 
8. United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000); see also United 
States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has become 
ubiquitous in federal trial courts.”). 
9. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
10. Id. at 1014 (stating that a technique “must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”). 
11. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye 
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1228 
(1980). 
12. See Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative 
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 Hastings L.J. 1069, 
1138 (1998) (“Frye does not work because its measure of validity is the 
judgment of ‘the field,’ and the field may consist of nonsense. For example, 
the Frye doctrine cannot exclude astrology.”). 
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appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’based on what is known. In 
short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific 
knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.”13 In mak-
ing this reliability determination, the Daubert Court highlighted five 
factors: (1) empirical testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error 
rate, (4) maintenance of standards, and (5) general acceptance.14 The 
first and most important factor is empirical testing. The other factors 
are supplementary.15 Peer review and publication are designed to expose 
defects in testing. Acceptance of a technique within the scientific 
community is achieved through the publication of valid test results. 
Similarly, both error rates and standards are derived from testing. 
Daubert was followed in 1999 by Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,16 
which held that Daubert’s reliability standard applied to all expert testi-
mony, not only scientific evidence.17 By 2000, the Supreme Court was 
describing Daubert as establishing an “exacting” standard.18 In the same 
year, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to incorporate the 
Daubert-Kumho standard.19 Although a handful of jurisdictions 
continue to apply the Frye test, about forty jurisdictions have adopted 
the Daubert standard in one form or another.20 
During this time, there was no shortage of commentary on the lack 
of empirical research in forensic science.21 For example, shortly after 
 
13. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (emphasis 
added). 
14. Id. at 593–94. 
15. Id. 
16. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
17. Id. at 141. 
18. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
19. After Daubert, the Court decided General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 
136 (1997). Joiner established the standard for appellate review—abuse of 
discretion—for applying the Daubert factors. Id. at 139. Daubert, Joiner, and 
Kumho make up what is known as the Daubert Trilogy. 
20. See 1 Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence § 1.11 (5th ed. 
2012). 
21. A few perceptive scholars had noted the lack of empirical testing prior to 
Daubert. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for 
Regulation, 4 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 109, 137 (1991) (“Forensic science is 
supported by almost no research. The laboratory practices are based on 
intuitions and deductions, not on empirical proof.”); D. Michael Risinger et 
al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons 
of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731, 738 
(1989) (“Our literature search for empirical evaluation of handwriting 
identification turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 
50 years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among 
examiners but that presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal 
information not qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of 
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Daubert was decided, Professor Margaret Berger wrote: “Considerable 
forensic evidence made its way into the courtroom without empirical 
validation of the underlying theory and/or its particular application.”22 
After Kumho, two commentators—citing bite mark, hair, and firearm 
analysis—observed that “little rigorous, systematic research has been 
done to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques, and in 
each area there was no evident reason why such research would be in-
feasible.”23 
Notwithstanding Daubert’s promise, scholars soon discerned its 
uneven application in civil and criminal cases: “[T]he heightened stand-
ards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in civil cases has 
continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the prosecution in 
criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in pre-
Daubert standards or approach.”24 The title of a 2005 article summed 
up the state of the law—“The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to 
Criminal Justice.”25 In short, in the criminal context, courts applied 
Daubert-lite. 
B. National Academy of Sciences Forensic Report (2009) 
In 2006 Congress entered the picture by authorizing the National 
Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to conduct a study of forensic science. 
After a three-year investigation, NAS issued a landmark report. One of 
 
one study in a 1978 government report. Beyond this, nothing.”); Michael J. 
Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach the 
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 361, 372 
(1991) (“[F]orensic scientists, like scientists in all other fields, should subject 
their claims to methodologically rigorous empirical tests. The results of these 
tests should be published and debated. Until such steps are taken, the strong 
claims of forensic scientists must be regarded with far more caution than 
they traditionally have been.”). 
22. Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 
78 Minn. L. Rev. 1345, 1354 (1994) (“Courts never required some of the 
most venerable branches of forensic science—such as fingerprinting, 
ballistics, and handwriting—to demonstrate their ability to make unique 
identifications.”). 
23. Paul Giannelli & Edward Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence: The Fallout 
from Supreme Court’s Decision in Kumho Tires, Crim. Just., Winter 2000, 
at 12, 40. For an insightful analysis of how identification science was accepted 
by the courts, see Saks, supra note 12. 
24. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards 
of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 99, 149 (2000). In 
addition, an extensive study of reported criminal cases found that “the 
Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony 
at either the trial or the appellate court levels.” Jennifer L. Groscup et al., 
The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State 
and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 339, 364 (2002). 
25. Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and 
Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 Am. J. Pub. Health S107, S107 (2005). 
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its most riveting passages concluded: “Among existing forensic meth-
ods, only nuclear DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the 
capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, dem-
onstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a specific in-
dividual or source.”26 The report went on to state that “some forensic 
science disciplines are supported by little rigorous systematic research 
to validate the discipline’s basic premises and techniques.”27 Such com-
mon forensic techniques as fingerprint examinations,28 firearm 
(“ballistics”) and toolmark identifications,29 handwriting examina-
tions,30 microscopic hair analysis,31 and bite mark comparisons32 fell into 
this category. 
Not only did the NAS report highlight flaws in forensic science, it 
sharply criticized the judiciary for failing to demand the validation that 
Daubert required: “The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic 
science disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish 
either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, 
and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this prob-
lem.”33 In a later passage, the report declared that “Daubert has done 
little to improve the use of forensic science evidence in criminal cases.”34 
The disparate treatment of civil actions and criminal prosecutions was 
also noted. After finding that “trial judges rarely exclude or restrict ex-
pert testimony offered by prosecutors,” the report commented: “iron-
ically, the appellate courts appear to be more willing to second-guess 
 
26. Comm. on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sci. Cmty., Nat’l 
Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United 
States: A Path Forward 100 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Forensic 
Report]. 
27. Id. at 22. At another point, the Report stated: “The simple reality is that 
the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific 
studies to determine its validity. This is a serious problem.” Id. at 8; see also 
id. at 6 (“Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic practice 
in a given discipline. And, even when protocols are in place . . . , they often 
are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way.”). 
28. Id. at 144 (noting that research is needed “[t]o properly underpin the process 
of friction ridge [fingerprint] identification”). 
29. Id. at 154 (“Sufficient studies [on firearms identification] have not been done 
to understand the reliability and repeatability of the methods.”). 
30. Id. at 166 (“The scientific basis for handwriting comparisons needs to be 
strengthened.”). 
31. Id. at 161 (“[T]estimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular 
defendants is highly unreliable.”). 
32. Id. at 174 (“No thorough study has been conducted of large populations to 
establish the uniqueness of bite marks . . . .”). 
33. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
34. Id. at 106. 
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trial court judgments on the admissibility of purported scientific evi-
dence in civil cases than in criminal cases.”35 Despite the NAS report, 
courts continued to admit the same evidence. Only a handful of courts 
applied the “exacting” standard that the Supreme Court said Daubert 
demanded.36 
This Article examines the justice system’s failure by reviewing the 
status of two categories of forensic techniques. The first category in-
volves discredited techniques: (1) bite mark analysis, (2) microscopic 
hair comparisons, (3) arson evidence, and (4) comparative bullet lead 
analysis. The second category involves techniques that have been mis-
leadingly presented, including firearm and toolmark identifications and 
fingerprint examinations. Both categories present Daubert issues. The 
Article argues that the system’s failure can be traced back to its in-
ability to demand and properly evaluate foundational research—i.e., 
Daubert’s first factor, empirical testing. Indeed, the justice system may 
be institutionally incapable of applying Daubert in criminal cases. 
A different paradigm is needed, one that assigns an independent 
agency the responsibility of evaluating foundational research. As dis-
cussed in Part IV, this approach was recently recommended by the 
National Commission on Forensic Science37 and the President’s Council 
of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”).38 Both recom-
mended that the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) evaluate all forensic disciplines on a continuing basis, thereby 
injecting much needed scientific expertise into the criminal justice 
system. The recent reports on latent fingerprints39 and arson 
 
35. Id. at 11. 
36. See, e.g., Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). A former federal 
district judge, Nancy Gertner, noted, “a busy trial judge can rely on the 
decades of case law to legitimize decisions rejecting a hearing or motions in 
limine. And the trial judge can count on the Court of Appeals likely 
concluding that rejecting the challenge was not an abuse of the judge’s 
discretion.” Nancy Gertner, Commentary on The Need for a Research 
Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 789, 790 (2011). 
37. In 2013, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), in partnership with the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), established the 
National Commission on Forensic Science to enhance the practice and 
improve the reliability of forensic science. The author served on the 
Commission. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., U.S. DOJ, Reflecting 
Back—Looking Toward the Future 1, app. A at 1 (2017). 
38. President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the 
President: Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring 
Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016) 
[hereinafter White House PCAST Report]. 
39. See William Thompson et al., Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Sci., Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis: 
Latent Fingerprint Analysis 7–8, 43–44 (2017) [hereinafter AAAS 
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investigations,40 which were published by the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (“AAAS”), buttress the need for inde-
pendent scientific evaluations. 
I. Discredited Techniques 
A. Bite Mark Comparisons 
For decades, bite-mark evidence has been admitted in hundreds of 
trials,41 many of which were capital prosecutions.42 No reported Ameri-
can case has rejected bite mark testimony. Moreover, it is not un-
common for courts to speak of bite mark comparisons as a “science”43 
—even an “exact science.”44 Acceptance of the technique is so deeply 
entrenched that some courts have taken judicial notice of its validity,45 
which means its reliability is indisputable.46  
Distinctive characteristics of a person’s dentition were first used to 
identify skeletonized remains and individuals in mass disasters such a 
 
Fingerprint Report] (discussing cognitive bias, recommending remedies, 
and arguing for the need of scientific validation studies). 
40. See José Almirall et al., Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., 
Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality and Gap Analysis: Fire 
Investigation 8–9 (2017) [hereinafter AAAS Fire Report] (discussing 
cognitive bias and recommending remedies). 
41. See 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 13.05 (discussing the admissibility 
of bite mark evidence). In Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 779 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1954), a bite mark was left in a piece of cheese in a burglary case. Two 
decades later, in Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1974), a prosecution expert matched the defendant’s teeth to a mark found 
on a murder victim. 
42. See, e.g., Tucker Carrington, Mississippi Innocence: The Convictions and 
Exonerations of Levon Brooks and Kennedy Brewer and the Failure of the 
American Promise, 28 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 123, 134–35, 142–45, 149–50 
(2015). 
43. See, e.g., People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (“[T]he 
science of bite-mark analysis has been extensively reviewed in other 
jurisdictions.”). 
44. See, e.g., State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 569 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
45. See State v. Richards, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (Ariz. 1990) (“[B]ite mark evidence 
is admissible without a preliminary determination of reliability . . . .”); 
People v. Middleton, 429 N.E.2d 100, 101 (N.Y. 1981) (“The reliability of 
bite mark evidence as a means of identification is sufficiently established in 
the scientific community to make such evidence admissible in a criminal case, 
without separately establishing scientific reliability in each case . . . .”); State 
v. Armstrong, 369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that trial court 
may take judicial notice of general reliability of bite mark evidence). 
46. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not 
subject to reasonable dispute”). 
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plane crashes.47 Courts assumed that these distinctive characteristics 
can be transferred to another person’s skin during a violent crime—e.g., 
homicides, rapes, and child abuse48—an assumption that overlooked 
some obvious problems. First, bite marks typically involve no more than 
the edges of six to eight front teeth, not thirty-two teeth with five 
anatomical surfaces that can be used when comparing a deceased per-
son’s dentition with X-rays. Second, bite marks do not reveal artifacts 
such as fillings, crowns, etc., all of which assist in associating human 
remains with a person’s dental records.49 Moreover, human skin is ex-
tremely malleable and thus subject to various types of distortion.50 In 
addition, bite mark analysis is a subjective technique with no agreed-
upon methodology. 
 
47. 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 13.02 (discussing the admissibility of 
dental identifications). 
48. See People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350, 1358 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“The 
concept of identifying a suspect by matching his dentition to a bite mark 
found at the scene of a crime is a logical extension of the accepted principle 
that each person’s dentition is unique.”); People v. Smith, 443 N.Y.S.2d 551, 
556–57 (Cty. Ct. 1981) (“The basic premise is the unique nature of individual 
dentition and the virtually infinite number of individual bite 
configurations.”) (citations omitted). 
49. “Restorations alone, with varying shapes, sizes, and restorative materials, 
may offer numerous points for comparison. In addition to restorations, the 
number of teeth, prostheses, decay, malposition, malrotation, peculiar 
shapes, root canal therapy, bone patterns, bite relationship, and oral 
pathology may all provide identifying characteristics.” 1 Giannelli et al., 
supra note 20, § 13.02. 
50. See I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark 
Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 Sci. & Just. 85, 87 (2001) (“Skin is a poor 
registration material since it is highly variable in terms of anatomical 
location, underlying musculature or fat, curvature, and looseness or 
adherence to underlying tissues. Skin is highly visco-elastic, which allows 
stretching to occur during either the biting process or when evidence is 
collected.”). 
  One study classified different types of distortion: Primary distortion 
occurs at the time of biting and results (1) from the dynamics of the biting 
process (dynamic distortion) and (2) from the features of the tissue bitten 
(tissue distortion). Secondary distortion occurs at a subsequent time. It can 
be subdivided into three categories. The first is time-related distortion, e.g., 
caused by subsequent healing or decomposition. “Posture distortion results 
when the bite mark is viewed or recorded in a position that differs from the 
position at the time of biting.” Photographic distortion results from the angle 
of the camera and the curvature of the body. D.R. Sheasby & D.G. 
MacDonald, A Forensic Classification of Distortion in Human Bite Marks, 
122 Forensic Sci. Int’l 75, 75–77 (2001). 
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1. Foundational Research 
Despite overwhelming judicial approval, bite mark evidence is not 
supported by foundational research.51 Indeed, the only rigorous studies 
are recent—and undercut the technique’s validity.52 The 2009 NAS 
forensic report concluded that “the scientific basis is insufficient to 
conclude that bite mark comparisons can result in a conclusive 
match.”53 Despite the NAS Report, courts continued to permit expert 
testimony on the subject. For example, in State v. Prade,54 decided in 
2014, the expert testified that “bite mark evidence is generally accepted 
within the scientific community . . . .”55 Similarly, in Coronado v. 
State,56 a different expert stated that he did not “agree with the NAS 
Report’s conclusion that bite mark analysis cannot result in a conclusive 
match,” adding, “you do not have to be a ‘rocket scientist’ to see that, 
in some cases, there is a unique and distinct pattern of teeth that can 
be identified.”57 In addition, these experts rejected the valid research 
 
51. See Saks, supra note 12, at 1120 (“[R]ather than the field convincing the 
courts of the sufficiency of its knowledge and skills, admission by the courts 
apparently convinced the forensic odontology community that, despite their 
doubts, they really were able to perform bite mark identifications.”). 
52. Dr. Mary Bush and her colleagues at the Laboratory for Forensic 
Odontology, State University of New York at Buffalo, have published over 
a dozen studies that have undermined the assumptions underpinning bite 
mark evidence. E.g., Mary A. Bush et al., Statistical Evidence for the 
Similarity of the Human Dentition, 56 J. Forensic Scis. 118, 122 (2011) 
(“Our results show that given our measurement parameters, statements 
concerning dental uniqueness with respect to bitemark analysis in an open 
population are unsupportable. . . . Confidence in the notion of dental 
uniqueness in bitemark analysis has been based on anecdotal knowledge, the 
use of inappropriate statistics, and precedence of admission in the 
courtroom.”). Bush and her team also reported the results of a study where 
twenty-three bites were made in cadaver skin with the same dentition using 
an instrumented-biting machine. The cadavers were moved and re-
photographed in different positions. Subsequent measurements showed 
differences between all bite marks. In addition, postural distortion was 
significant. See Mary A. Bush et al., Biomechanical Factors in Human 
Dermal Bitemarks in a Cadaver Model, 54 J. Forensic Scis. 167, 169–170, 
174 (2009). One survey of fifteen odontologists involved their opinions of six 
images of supposed bite marks. The “practitioner agreement was at best fair, 
with wide-ranging opinions on the origin, circumstance, and characteristics 
of the wound given for all six images.” Mark Page et al., Expert 
Interpretation of Bitemark Injuries—A Contemporary Qualitative Study, 58 
J. Forensic Scis. 664, 664 (2013). 
53. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 175. 
54. 9 N.E.3d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
55. Id. at 1097. 
56. 384 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). 
57. Id. at 926. 
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mentioned above,58 and both prosecutors and their experts attacked re-
searchers without offering any foundational research.59 
Unfortunately, the American Board of Forensic Odontology 
(“ABFO”) has fiercely defended bite mark analysis. To bolster its 
position, the ABFO conducted a study that was presented at a forensic 
conference in 2015.60 As it turned out, the study undercut the ABFO’s 
own position. Thirty-nine ABFO-certified bite mark experts—with an 
average of twenty years’ experience—examined one hundred bite mark 
photographs.61 Each was asked three questions: 
1. Is there sufficient evidence in the presented materials to render 
an opinion on whether the patterned injury is a human bite 
mark? 
 
58. See, e.g., Prade, 9 N.E.3d at 1098 (“As to Dr. Bush’s cadaver studies, Dr. 
Wright testified that cadaver skin simply cannot compare with living skin. 
Dr. Wright explained that cadaver skin only distorts after a bite for two to 
three minutes at most because, unlike live skin, no bruising, contusions, or 
lacerations occur. Dr. Wright also testified that using a mechanical jaw to 
bite is problematic because the jaw operates on a fixed hinge that cannot 
mimic the wider range of movement that an actual jaw is capable of.”). But 
see Iain A. Pretty & David Sweet, A Paradigm Shift in the Analysis of 
Bitemarks, 201 Forensic Sci. Int’l 38, 40 (2010) (noting that, while 
cadaver models have limitations, “there is little alternative for researchers to 
produce bitemarks of known origin” and the use of anesthetized pigs to create 
peri-mortem injuries raises a different issue—i.e., differences between pigskin 
and human skin). 
59. See Radley Balko, In Angry, Defensive Memo, Manhattan DA’s Office 
Withdraws Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (Jan. 13, 2016), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/01/13/in-angry-defens 
ive-memo-manhattan-das-office-withdraws-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_term= 
.48e8ac4cc71e [https://perma.cc/CMD7-6GM4]; Radley Balko, Attack of the 
Bite Mark Matchers, Wash. Post (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/18/attack-of-the-bite-
mark-matchers-2/?utm_term=.3455206afa8d [https://perma.cc/T3R3-
T7ZH]; Radley Balko, The Path Forward on Bite Mark Matching—and the 
Rearview Mirror, Wash. Post (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/20/the-path-forward-
on-bite-mark-matching-and-the-rearview-mirror/?utm_term=.41c6a22faa7d 
[https://perma.cc/9GFW-NABV]. 
60. The study is known as Construct Validity Bitemark Assessments Using the 
ABFO Bitemark Decision Tree (“Freeman/Pretty Study”). See Am. Acad. 
of Forensic Scis., Advance Program 67th Annual Scientific 
Meeting: Celebrating the Forensic Science Family 175 (2015). 
61. Radley Balko, A Bite Mark Matching Advocacy Group Just Conducted a 
Study that Discredits Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/04/08/a-bite-
mark-matching-advocacy-group-just-conducted-a-study-that-discredits-bite-
mark-evidence/?utm_term=.b752ad99e635 [https://perma.cc/EB2B-C 
DYD]. 
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2. Is it a human bite mark, not a human bite mark, or suggestive 
of a human bite mark? 
3. Does the bite mark have distinct, identifiable arches and 
individual tooth marks?62 
The results to the first question were not reassuring. The thirty-
nine experts agreed unanimously in only four out of the one hundred 
cases.63 In only twenty cases was there 90 percent or more agreement.64 
At the end of question two—whether the mark is a human bite mark—
there were only sixteen cases with 90 percent or more agreement.65 At 
the end of the third question, there were only eight cases in which at 
least 90 percent of the analysts agreed.66 Equally disturbing was the 
ABFO’s decision to postpone publishing the results “until the 
organization can tweak the design of the study and conduct it again, a 
process that’s expected to take at least a year.”67 In effect, ABFO 
wanted a do-over. Meanwhile, an Associated Press analysis reported 
that at least twenty-four men convicted or charged with murder or rape 
based on bite marks have been exonerated since 2000.68 
2. Texas Forensic Science Commission (2016) 
Steven Chaney spent twenty-eight years in prison for murder based 
largely on bite mark evidence. When his conviction was overturned,69 
the Innocence Project filed a complaint on his behalf with the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission (“TFSC”).70 In 2016, after a six-month 
 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Amanda Lee Myers, Once Key in Some Cases, Bite-Mark Evidence Now 
Derided as Unreliable, Yahoo (June 16, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/ 
news/ap-impact-bites-derided-unreliable-court-150004412.html [https:// 
perma.cc/875Q-9RB6]. 
69. Sarah Kaplan, Texas Inmate’s 1989 Conviction Overturned After Bite Mark 
Evidence Discredited, Wash. Post (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/13/texas-mans-convict 
ion-overturned-after-bite-mark-evidence-discredited/?utm_term=.d3513f42c6 
99 [https://perma.cc/T6UX-XETE]. 
70. Texas Forensic Science Commission Steps Up to Investigate Bite Mark 
Analysis, Innocence Project (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.innocence 
project.org/texas-forensic-science-commission-steps-up-to-investigate-bite-
mark-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/BC95-HGB8]. Texas created the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission (TFSC) in 2005 after a scandal required 
Houston to close its crime lab. Michael Hall, False Impressions, Tex. 
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investigation, the TFSC recommended a moratorium on the admission 
of bite mark testimony. It found that there is no scientific basis for 
claiming that a particular mark can be associated to a person’s den-
tition: “Any testimony describing human dentition as ‘like a fingerprint’ 
or incorporating similar analogies lacks scientific support.”71 Similarly, 
“there is no scientific basis for assigning probability or statistical weight 
to an association, regardless of whether such probability or weight is 
expressed numerically (e.g., 1 in a million) or using some form of verbal 
scale (e.g., highly likely/unlikely).”72 
TFSC was also alarmed that the ABFO study was not published 
due to “political and organizational pressures.”73 In the Commission’s 
view, “such a resistance to publish scientific data contradicts the ethical 
and professional obligations of the profession as a whole, and is es-
pecially disconcerting when one considers the life and liberty interests 
at stake in criminal cases.”74 
3. White House PCAST Report (2016) 
In September 2016, the White House released its report on forensic 
science.75 Regarding bite mark analysis, it concluded that (1) appro-
priately designed validation studies are lacking, (2) the few available 
studies had “very high” false-positive rates, (3) “inappropriate closed-
set designs . . . are likely to underestimate the true false positive rate,” 
and (4) the studies show that experts “cannot even consistently agree 
 
Monthly (Jan. 2016), https://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/false-
impressions/ [https://perma.cc/6JJR-GA9Y]. Accordingly, Tex. Code 
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.01, § 4(a)(3) (Supp. 2015), provides that the 
Commission should “investigate, in a timely manner, any allegation of 
professional negligence or misconduct that would substantially affect the 
integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by a crime 
laboratory.” 
71. Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n, Forensic Bitemark Comparison 
Complaint Filed by National Innocence Project on Behalf of 
Steven Mark Chaney—Final Report 11-12 (2016). 
72. Id. at 12. 
73. Id. at 13 
74. Id.; see also Brandi Grissom, Arguments Over Bite Marks Get Testy at Texas 
Forensic Science Commission Meeting, Dallas Morning News (Nov. 17, 
2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2015/11/17/arguments-
over-bite-marks-get-testy-at-forensic-science-commission-meeting [https:// 
perma.cc/V536-3RB8] (reporting on a 2015 TFSC meeting discussing 
bitemark evidence). 
75. See generally White House PCAST Report, supra note 38. 
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on whether an injury is a human bitemark.”76 Numerous cases support 
the last observation.77 
In sum, the courts have yet to reject bite mark evidence—a sub-
jective method that is not supported by foundational research and lacks 
agreed-upon standards.78 “Perhaps no discredited forensic assay has 
benefitted more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper responsi-
bilities than bite mark analysis.”79 Instead, it was the Innocence Project 
that spearheaded the challenges in this area, and in 2016 the Texas 
Forensic Science Commission became the first governmental body to 
seriously scrutinize the technique. Notwithstanding the NAS, PCAST, 
and TFSC reports, courts continue to admit bite mark evidence.80 
 
76. Id. at 9. “PCAST finds that bitemark analysis is far from meeting the 
scientific standards for foundational validity.” Id. 
77. See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]he 
defense attempted to rebut Dr. Warnick’s testimony with the testimony of 
other experts who opined that the mark on the victim’s cheek was the result 
of livor mortis and was not a bite mark at all.”); Czapleski v. Woodward, 
No. C-90-0847 MHP, 1991 WL 639360, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1991) 
(noting that, while a dentist’s initial report concluded that “bite” marks 
found on child were consistent with dental impressions of mother, several 
experts later established that the marks on child’s body were postmortem 
abrasion marks and not bite marks); Kinney v. State, 868 S.W.2d 463, 464–
65 (Ark. 1994) (noting disagreement between expert witnesses about whether 
injuries were from human bite marks); People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160, 
1165 n.1 (Cal. 1992) (“At trial, extensive testimony by forensic 
ondontologists [sic] was presented by both sides, pro and con, as to whether 
the wounds were human bite marks and, if so, when they were inflicted.”); 
State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533, 553 (La. 2001) (“Both defense experts 
testified that these marks on the victim’s body were not bite marks.”); 
Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656, 668 (Miss. 2003) (“Dr. Galvez denied the 
impressions found on Williams were the results of bite marks.”). 
78. See Michael J. Saks et al., Forensic Bitemark Identification: Weak 
Foundations, Exaggerated Claims, 3 J.L. & Biosciences 1, 29 (2016) 
(“[R]ecent reviews of the field’s claims, as well as recent empirical findings, 
have underscored the lack of reliability and validity of the most fundamental 
claims about the ability of forensic dentists to identify the source of bite 
marks on human skin.”). 
79. M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic 
Science’s Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 Va. J. Crim. L. 1, 38 
(2016). 
80. In Commonwealth v. Ross, No. CP-07-CR 2038-2004, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Com. 
Pl. Blair Cty., Pa., filed Mar. 8, 2017), the court admitted bite mark 
evidence, albeit limited, noting that “[t]he Commonwealth notes that no 
state or federal court has suppressed expert testimony in a criminal case 
based upon the NAS Report, and that no courts have prohibited bite mark 
evidence based upon the PCAST and TFSC reports.” See also Radley Balko, 
Incredibly, Prosecutors Are Still Defending Bite Mark Evidence, Wash. 
Post (Jan 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2017/01/30/incredibly-prosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-mark-
evidence/ [https://perma.cc/V6TF-HTU9]. 
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At the April 10, 2017 meeting of the National Commission on 
Forensic Science, Keith Harward described how bite mark evidence re-
sulted in his thirty-three years of imprisonment before he was exon-
erated by DNA evidence.81 Incredibly, the next day the chairman of the 
National District Attorneys Association stated that his organization 
believes that bite mark evidence is a “reliable science.”82 
B. Microscopic Hair Analysis 
In this examination, samples are first analyzed to identify features 
visible to the naked eye such as color and form, i.e., whether it is 
straight, wavy, or curved. Next, the sample is viewed microscopically 
to determine characteristics such as shaft form, hair diameter, and 
pigment size.83 
Experts have long acknowledged that a positive identification is not 
possible with microscopic hair analysis. Instead, examiners testify that 
a crime scene exemplar was “consistent with” a hair sample from the 
de-fendant. The probative value of this conclusion would, of course, 
vary if only a hundred people had microscopically indistinguishable hair 
as opposed to several million. Due to a lack of research, no one knows 
whether the crime scene hair could have come from 10 other persons or 
100, 10,000, and so forth.84 This important qualifying information was 
 
81. See Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., U.S. DOJ, Meeting #13, at 61–
63 (2017) [hereinafter Meeting #13]; Frank Green, DNA Proves Man 
Innocent of 1982 Rape and Murder in Famous ‘Bite-Mark’ Case, Lawyers 
Say, Richmond Times-Dispatch (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.richmond. 
com/news/dna-proves-man-innocent-of-rape-and-murder-in-famous/article 
_05ab68ce-064c-58bb-b57a-211e2bb51ecd.html [https://perma.cc/WUW4-
3R57] (discussing the Keith Harward case); Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Exoneration 
Underscores Mounting Challenges to Bite-Mark Evidence, Wash. Post 
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-
exoneration-underscores-to-mounting-challenges-to-bite-mark-evidence/ 
2016/04/08/55bbfe98-fd9a-11e5-886f-a037dba38301_story.html?utm_term 
=.262f4d5c302d [https://perma.cc/263G-QK5E] (same). 
82. Meeting #13, supra note 81, at 111; e.g., Pema Levy, Sessions’ New 
Forensic Science Adviser Has a History of Opposing Pro-Science Reforms, 
Mother Jones (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/crime-
justice/2017/08/sessions-new-forensic-science-adviser-has-a-history-of-opposin 
g-pro-science-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/R3AR-DJSQ]. 
83. See generally 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 24.02[l] (discussing the 
techniques used to identify the human source of a hair sample, including 
conventional microscopy). 
84. As one hair examiner wrote, “[i]f a pubic hair from the scene of a crime is 
found to be similar to those from a known source, [the courts] do not know 
whether the chances that it could have originated from another source are 
one in two or one in a billion.” B.D. Gaudette, Probabilities and Human 
Pubic Hair Comparisons, 21 J. Forensic Sci. 514, 514 (1976). 
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often omitted from the experts’ testimony, thus making marginal evi-
dence appear misleadingly convincing.85 
Experts frequently went way beyond the “consistent with” language 
in their testimony, however, often suggesting a rare association. For ex-
ample, in the Edward Honaker case, the expert testified that the crime 
scene hair sample “was unlikely to match anyone” other than the 
defendant.86 Honaker spent ten years in prison before DNA proved him 
innocent.87 In another case, an expert testified that matching hair 
samples were “consistent microscopically” but then elaborated: “In oth-
er words, hairs are not an absolute identification, but they either came 
from this individual or there is—could be another individual somewhere 
in the world that would have the same characteristics to their hair.”88 
This is an implicit—and extreme—probability statement that lacks any 
empirical support. 
Although microscopic hair analysis had long been judicially ac-
cepted,89 its validity was suspect.90 In 1995, a federal district court in 
 
85. Professor Berger explained the problem: 
We allow eyewitnesses to testify that the person fleeing the scene 
wore a yellow jacket and permit proof that a defendant owned a 
yellow jacket without establishing the background rate of yellow 
jackets in the community. Jurors understand, however, that others 
than the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about 
samples matching in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious to 
the probability concerns if no background rate is offered, or may be 
unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a match is 
confused with the probability of guilt, or if a background rate is 
offered that does not have an adequate scientific foundation. 
 Berger, supra note 22, at 1357. 
86. Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by 
Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish 
Innocence After Trial 58 (1996). 
87. Id. at 59. 
88. Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995) 
(emphasis added), rev’d sub nom. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process—not Daubert—controls in federal 
habeas review). 
89. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Hair Analysis: The Case Against the 
Underemployment of Scientific Evidence, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 41, 62 
(1982) (stating that “[t]he massive body of case law, liberally admitting even 
hair evidence of low probative value, dwarfs the handful of cases excluding 
hair evidence”). 
90. See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair 
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century 
Snake Oil?, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227, 231 (1996) (“If the 
purveyors of this dubious science cannot do a better job of validating hair 
analysis than they have done so far, forensic hair comparison analysis should 
be excluded altogether from criminal trials.”). 
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Williamson v. Reynolds91 observed: “Although the hair expert may have 
followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the 
human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scien-
tifically unreliable.”92 The court also noted that the “expert did not 
explain which of the ‘approximately’ 25 characteristics were consistent, 
any standards for determining whether the samples were consistent, 
how many persons could be expected to share this same combination of 
characteristics, or how he arrived at his conclusions.”93 Williamson, who 
was five days from execution when the district court issued a stay, was 
subsequently exonerated by DNA testing.94 
The Williamson opinion—perhaps the only thorough judicial anal-
ysis of microscopic hair comparisons—was all but ignored by other 
courts. In 1999 in Johnson v. Commonwealth,95 the Kentucky Supreme 
Court upheld the admissibility of hair evidence, taking “judicial notice” 
of its reliability96 and thus implicitly finding its validity indisputable.97 
Other courts echoed Johnson, not Williamson.98 Indeed, ten years after 
Williamson was decided, a 2005 decision by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court observed—correctly—that “[t]he overwhelming majority of 
courts have deemed such evidence admissible.”99 
Once again, the courts abdicated their responsibility. Indeed, hair 
evidence only began to be carefully scrutinized after a startling number 
of DNA exonerations were reported.100 A 2008 study of 200 DNA 
 
91. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (E.D. Okla. 1995), rev’d sub nom. Williamson v. Ward, 
110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997). 
92. Id. at 1558. 
93. Id. at 1554. 
94. See Jim Dwyer et al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution 
and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 146 (2000) 
(noting that the hair evidence was shown to be “patently unreliable”). See 
also John Grisham, The Innocent Man: Murder and Injustice in a 
Small Town 166–87 (2006) (examining Williamson’s trial, including the 
role played by hair analysis). 
95. 12 S.W.3d 258 (Ky. 1999). 
96. Id. at 263. 
97. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (limiting judicial notice to a “fact that is not 
subject to reasonable dispute”). 
98. See 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 24.03, at 825 (noting the “limited 
impact of Daubert”). 
99. State v. West, 877 A.2d 787, 808 (Conn. 2005). 
100. In 1998, a Canadian judicial inquiry into the wrongful conviction of Guy 
Paul Morin was released. Morin’s original conviction was based, in part, on 
hair evidence. The judge conducting the inquiry recommended that “[t]rial 
judges should undertake a more critical analysis of the admissibility of hair 
comparison evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Fred Kaufman, 
Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Kaufman 
Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin 312 (1998); 
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exonerations found that forensic evidence was the second leading type 
of evidence, at 57 percent—after eyewitness identifications at 79 
percent—used in wrongful conviction cases.101 A subsequent 
investigation of trial transcripts underscored the role of hair analysis in 
the exoneration cases: “Of the 65 cases involving microscopic hair com-
parison in which transcripts were located, 25 cases, or 38%, had invalid 
forensic science testimony.”102 The 2009 NAS Report observed that 
“testimony linking microscopic hair analysis with particular defendants 
is highly unreliable.”103 
1. FBI Hair Review 
In April 2013, the Mississippi Supreme Court, in a five-to-four 
decision, rejected Willie Jerome Manning’s request for a stay of 
execution to permit DNA testing—“potentially setting up what experts 
said would be a rare case in recent years in which a person is put to 
death with such requests unmet.”104 A week later, the court unex-
pectedly stayed Manning’s execution after the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) notified state officials that FBI experts had presented mis-
leading testimony at his trial, including hair and firearms evidence.105 
Soon after, the DOJ announced that Manning was but one of 120 
cases—including twenty-seven death penalty prosecutions—in which 
improper microscopic hair analysis had been introduced in evidence.106 
 
see also Edward Connors et al., supra note 86, at 3334–76 (discussing 
cases in which hair samples played a role in convicting defendants who were 
later exonerated by DNA evidence). 
101. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 81 
(2008). 
102. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony 
and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14–15 (2009). 
103. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 161. 
104. Campbell Robertson, Mississippi Inmate’s Bid for DNA Tests Is Denied with 
Tuesday Execution Set, N.Y. Times (May 3, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/05/04/us/dna-tests-rejected-for-inmate-facing-tuesday-
execution.html [https://perma.cc/58JT-VN35]; see also Andrew Cohen, A 
Ghost of Mississippi: The Willie Manning Capital Case, Atlantic (May 2, 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/05/a-ghost-of-
mississippi-the-willie-manning-capital-case/275442/ [https://perma.cc/Q72 
4-2K7U]. 
105. See Campbell Robertson, With Hours to Go, Execution Is Postponed, N.Y. 
Times (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/willie-j-
manning-granted-stay-of-execution.html [https://perma.cc/J84G-LPX2] 
(noting that the DOJ “disavow[ed] the degree of certainty expressed by 
F.B.I. forensic experts at the man’s trial”). 
106. See Jack Nicas, Flawed Evidence Under a Microscope: Disputed Forensic 
Techniques Draw Fresh Scrutiny; FBI Says It Is Reviewing Thousands of 
Convictions, Wall St. J. (July 18, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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For example, examiners claimed to connect a hair sample to a single 
person “to the exclusion of all others” or stated or suggested a prob-
ability for such a match from past casework.107 The FBI review came 
after three District of Columbia men, who had been convicted of rape 
or murder in the early 1980s, were exonerated through DNA testing.108 
In one of these cases, the prosecutor claimed that, based on an FBI ex-
pert’s testimony, the chances that the sample came from someone else 
were “one in 10 million.”109 
After further investigation, DOJ reported in 2015 that “FBI ex-
aminers had provided scientifically invalid testimony in more than 95 
percent of cases where that testimony was used to inculpate a defendant 
at trial.”110 Commonwealth v. Perrot111 was one of the first cases to reach 
the courtroom as a consequence of the DOJ review. A superior court 
granted Perrot a new trial in 2016, criticizing the misleading use of hair 
evidence. The court noted: “In discussing the ‘microscopic charac-
teristics’ of hair, [the expert] stated that these characteristics ‘make 
that hair somewhat unique.’ He likened the ‘subtle’ characteristics of 
 
SB10001424127887324263404578614161262653152 [https://perma.cc/37W 
N-MRCZ]. 
107. Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Reviewing 27 Death Penalty Convictions for FBI 
Forensic Testimony Errors, Wash. Post (July 17, 2013), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-reviewing-27-death-penalty-convictions-
for-fbi-forensic-testimony-errors/2013/07/17/6c75a0a4-bd9b-11e2-89c9-3be80 
95fe767_story.html?utm_term=.d9ec6013dda8 [https://perma.cc/53Y4-
C9MS] (“[O]n the witness stand, several agents for years went beyond the 
science and testified that their hair analysis was a near-certain match.”). 
108. See Editorial, FBI Lab Failures Should Lead to Reform, Wash. Post (Apr. 
20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fbi-lab-failures-
should-lead-to-reform/2012/04/20/gIQAe6lYWT_story.html?utm_term=. 
13c701fdc3c6 [https://perma.cc/637M-HY97] (“Kirk L. Odom was 
incarcerated for 20 years and Donald E. Gates for nearly 30 for crimes they 
did not commit. Santae A. Tribble spent 28 years behind bars, even though 
DNA evidence now shows he almost undoubtedly was not the culprit.”). 
109. Martin Enserink, Evidence on Trial, 351 Sci. 1129, 1129 (Mar. 11, 2016), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/351/6278/1128.full.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/6LXB-BR7B]. The prosecutor misstated the expert’s testimony. 
110. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 3; see also Editorial, 
Junk Science at the F.B.I., N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/junk-science-at-the-fbi.html [https: 
//perma.cc/L5A3-THN2] (noting “a sweeping post-conviction review of 
2,500 cases in which its hair-sample lab reported a match”); Hugh B. Kaplan, 
DOJ Examiners Gave Bad Testimony in 90 Percent of Hair Comparison 
Cases, 97 Crim. L. Rpt. 77, 77 (2015) (“[T]he review has revealed that FBI 
examiners made erroneous statements in 90 percent of the cases that have 
been re-examined so far.”). 
111. Nos. 85–5415, 5416, 5418, 5420, 5425, 2016 WL 380123 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 26, 2016). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure 
888 
hair that ‘make it somewhat unique’ to the subtle differences in a 
human face.”112 
2. White House PCAST Report (2016) 
In June 2016, the DOJ released proposed guidelines concerning hair 
testimony. Documentation purporting to support the validity and relia-
bility of hair evidence accompanied the guidelines.113 Listing several 
studies, the FBI concluded: 
Based on these and other published studies, microscopic hair 
comparison has been demonstrated to be a valid and reliable 
scientific methodology. These studies have also shown that 
microscopic hair comparisons alone cannot lead to personal 
identification and it is crucial that this limitation be conveyed 
both in the written report and in testimony.114 
The White House PCAST Report, however, challenged the support-
ing documentation, which discussed only a handful of studies from the 
1970s and 1980s but did not comment on subsequent studies that found 
“substantial flaws in the methodology and results of the key papers.”115 
Moreover, “PCAST’s own review of the cited papers [found] that these 
studies do not establish the foundational validity and reliability of hair 
analysis.”116 
 
112. Id. at *32. The court also noted: 
[The expert] asserted that the hairs “matched” and showed a “strong 
association.” In discussing the chance that the hair found on the 
victim’s bed came from someone other than Perrot, [the expert] 
conceded the possibility, adding that during his ten years of 
experience “it’s extremely rare that I will have known hair samples 
from two different people that I can’t tell apart.” [The expert] made 
these statements of confidence, despite being unable to recall at trial 
the length or diameter of the one hair found on the bed. 
 Id. 
113. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, DOJ, Justice Department Issues Draft 
Guidance Regarding Expert Testimony and Lab Reports in Forensic Science 
(June 3, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-
draft-guidance-regarding-expert-testimony-and-lab-reports-forensic [https:// 
perma.cc/T3BK-5P9Q]. These documents are known as the Uniform 
Language for Testimony and Reports. Id. 
114. DOJ, Supporting Documentation for Department of Justice 
Proposed Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the 
Forensic Hair Examination Discipline 4 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ 
Supporting Documentation], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/ 
file/877736/download [https://perma.cc/79FV-GCSK]. 
115. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 13. 
116. Id. DOJ cited Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, Correlation of Microscopic 
and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. Forensic Scis. 964 
(2002). DOJ Supporting Documentation, supra note 114, at 8. This FBI 
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The bottom line, again, is the judiciary’s dereliction in failing to 
curb the misuse of hair microscopy testimony. The Innocence Project’s 
track record of DNA exonerations brought this issue to the fore. Indeed, 
the three exonerations in the District of Columbia triggered the FBI re-
view. Yet, DOJ’s proposed guidelines were based on “foundational 
research” that PCAST questioned. 
C. Arson Investigations 
For decades, arson investigators came from the “old school” of 
investigators—those who used intuition and a number of rules of thumb 
to determine whether a fire was incendiary. Critics complained that in-
stead of being rooted in science, the approach was based on folklore 
that had been passed down from generation to generation—without any 
empirical testing.117 A government report noted, as early as 1977, that 
common arson indicators had “received little or no scientific testing” 
and that “[t]here appears to be no published material in the scientific 
literature to substantiate their validity.”118 Proponents of a science-
based approach to arson investigations waged an uphill battle through 
the 1980s, finally winning a major victory when the National Fire 
Protection Association (“NFPA”) published its Guide for Fire and 
Explosion Investigations (“NFPA 921”) in 1992.119 
1. Willingham Case 
Although NFPA 921 would later become the bible for arson 
investigations,120 Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted for the 
 
study used mitochondrial DNA analysis to re-examine samples from previous 
FBI microscopic hair examination cases. Houck & Budowle, supra, at 964. 
The PCAST Report did not accept that this study supported validity and 
reliability because the study showed that in nine of eighty cases—11 
percent—the microscopic examination found the hair indistinguishable but 
DNA analysis showed that the hairs came from different individuals. White 
House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 28. 
117. See John J. Lentini, Scientific Protocols for Fire Investigation 
471–505 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing myths of arson investigations); Paul C. 
Giannelli, Junk Science and the Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & Liberty 221, 225 (2013). 
118. John F. Boudreau et al., Nat’l Inst. of Law Enf’t & Criminal 
Justice, DOJ, Arson and Arson Investigation: Survey and 
Assessment 88 (1977). 
119. Nat’l Fire Prot. Ass’n, NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion 
Investigations, 2017 Edition 1 (2016) [hereinafter NFPA 921]. The 
NFPA promotes fire prevention and safety. Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 
117. 
120. See United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 109 n.39 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(“NFPA 921 . . . is widely accepted as the standard guide in the field of fire 
investigation.”); Thomas R. May, Fire Pattern Analysis, Junk Science, Old 
Wives Tales, and Ipse Dixit: Emerging Forensic 3D Imaging Technologies 
to the Rescue?, 16 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 5 (2010) (noting that NFPA 921 
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arson-murders of his young children weeks before the guide was 
published. Willingham, who was executed twelve years later, is the 
poster boy for junk science in arson investigations.121 
At trial, Deputy Fire Marshall Vasquez testified that “[t]he fire tells 
a story. I am just the interpreter . . . . And the fire does not lie. It tells 
me the truth.”122 He also testified that he had found numerous so-called 
“indicators” for arson during his post-fire investigation of Willingham’s 
house.123 One such indicator was a low burning fire.124 He told the jury 
that “[a]ll fire goes up,”125 and thus, burn patterns on the floor and 
lower walls suggested that an accelerant was used.126 This reasonable 
 
has “become the de facto national standard for fire scene examination and 
analysis”). 
121. See Frontline: Death by Fire (PBS television broadcast Oct. 19, 2010) 
(detailing the case of Cameron Todd Willingham); David Grann, Trial by 
Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, New Yorker (Sept. 7, 2009), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [https:// 
perma.cc/Z5PU-P7BS] (noting that after Willingham’s execution, the 
Innocence Project commissioned a panel of fire experts that, after reviewing 
the evidence supporting the conviction, “concluded that ‘each and every one’ 
of the indicators of arson had been ‘scientifically proven to be invalid’”); 
Hall, supra note 70 (“The 893-page report [on the Willingham case], released 
in April 2011, was anticlimactic for people looking for proof that Texas had 
executed an innocent man.”); Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Texas Man 
Executed on Disproved Forensics: Fire that Killed His 3 Children Could 
Have Been Accidental, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 9, 2004), http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/2004-12-09/news/0412090169_1_cameron-todd-willingh 
am-arson-fire-fire-scene [https://perma.cc/2CLW-25SK] (“[The fire 
investigators] used rules of thumb that have since been shown to be false. 
There was no evidence to support a conclusion that the fire was 
intentionally set. Just an unsupported opinion.”). 
122. Statement of Facts at vol. XI, 244, State v. Willingham, No. 24,467-CR 
(Dist. Ct. Navarro Cty., Tex. 1992) [hereinafter Willingham Transcript], 
aff’d, 897 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). 
123. See id. at 224–68 (recording the direct examination of Manuel Vasquez). A 
second expert’s testimony essentially tracked Vasquez’s. See id. at 156–85 
(recording the testimony of Douglas Fogg). 
124. Id. at 248. Vasquez testified that there was “char burning, like, for example, 
this is the bottom here. It’s burned down here at the bottom. That is an 
indicator in my investigation of an origin of fire because it’s the lowest part 
of the fire.” Id. at 239; see also Willingham, 897 S.W.2d at 354 (“An expert 
witness for the State testified that the floors, front threshold, and front 
concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accelerant has been 
used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that this 
igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen 
in their rescue attempts.”). 
125. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 232. 
126. Id. at 256 (“So when I found that the floor is hotter than the ceiling, that’s 
backwards, upside down. It shouldn’t be like that. The only reason that the 
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notion, however, has its limitations—especially when a fire occurs in a 
contained area, such as a house with its windows shut: 
Due to buoyancy, a thermal plume initially rises once a fire is 
ignited. As the fire continues, the plume reaches the ceiling, which 
causes it to spread outward towards the walls. When it reaches 
the walls, the combustion products press down from the ceiling 
creating an upper level, which continues to increase in depth and 
temperature. Eventually thermal radiation replaces convection as 
the principal method of heat transfer.127 
At this point, every combustible surface in the room will sponta-
neously burst into flames. This transition phenomenon, known as the 
onset of “flashover,” can occur within minutes.128 After flashover, the 
entire room is burning, including the lower walls and floor. Flashover 
has been described as the point at which the fire transitions from a “fire 
in a room” to a “room on fire.”129 At trial, prosecution witnesses ac-
knowledged that there was an explosion, which could be explained by 
flashover.130 Consequently, a low burning fire is not necessarily 
indicative of the use of an accelerant.131 
Moreover, many of Vasquez’s other “indicators”—including what 
he called “pour patterns” and “puddle configurations,”132 which appear 
as splotchy areas on the floor—can appear after flashover in an acci-
dental fire.133 Additional indicators, such as alligatoring—large shiny 
 
floor is hotter is because there was an accelerant.”); see also Giannelli, supra 
note 117, at 226. 
127. Giannelli, supra note 117, at 227. 
128. Id. 
129. Lentini, supra note 117, at 77. 
130. See Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 75 (testimony of 
Mary Diane Barbe) (“The windows, the electricity started crackling and 
popping, and the top of the—well, I was facing the side of the house, and it 
just blew out. The flames just blew out . . . . All the windows and the front 
room was engulfed.”); id. at 96 (testimony of Brandy Barbe) (“We was 
running towards the house, me and my mother, we was fixing to go and try 
to get in, and that’s when it was an explosion . . . .”). Vasquez mentioned 
flashover in his testimony, but he did not appear to understand its 
implications. See id. at vol XII, 47–48. 
131. Paul C. Giannelli & Kimberly Gawel, Arson Evidence, 47 Crim. L. Bull. 
1241, 1250–51 (2011) (identifying “flashover” as an alternative reason for 
“low burning” fires). 
132. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 244–45 (“You can see 
that on the burnt patterns on this puddle configuration on Exhibit No. 36. 
This is a strong indicator of a liquid. . . . [The sunlight] just lights up the 
puddle configurations, the burnt trailers, the pour patterns on that floor.”). 
133. Giannelli & Gawel, supra note 131, at 1242–44. 
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charred blisters on burned wood—can also be explained by flashover.134 
The flashover phenomenon also accounts for another fact that Vasquez 
thought incriminatory. Willingham told investigators that he had 
attempted to save his daughters, but he was forced to run from his 
home without shoes because the heat was too great. According to 
Vasquez, the burn debris on the floor made it impossible that 
Willingham would not have had burns on his feet.135 However, 
Willingham’s feet would not have been burnt if he left his home before 
flashover.136 
Charring under an aluminum threshold of an interior door provided 
another clue according to Vasquez.137 But again, this “indicator” may 
occur in a flashover. Other perceived “indicators”—melted bed 
springs,138 multiple points of origins,139 and brown stains on a concrete 
floor140—were also consistent with an accidental fire.141 Finally, Vasquez 
relied on the presence of “crazed glass”—spider-web patterns on the 
 
134. Id. at 1246. 
135. “There was fire on the floor . . . . He had no injuries on his feet.” Willingham 
Transcript, supra note 122, at 267. 
136. Giannelli, supra note 127, at 228. 
137. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at 251. 
138. “[T]he springs were burned from underneath. This indicates there was a fire 
under this bed because of the burn underneath the bed.” Id. at 241. 
139. Id. at 255 (“Multiple areas of origin indicate—especially if there is no 
connecting path, that they were intentionally set by human hands.”). There 
are two problems here. First, there could have been one origin, according to 
independent experts. Douglas J. Carpenter et al., Report on the 
Peer Review of the Expert Testimony in the Cases of State of 
Texas v. Cameron Todd Willingham and State of Texas v. Ernest 
Ray Willis 12 (2006). Second, even if the fire scene had shown multiple 
points of origin, this would not necessarily indicate an intentional fire. 
Lentini, supra note 117, at 513–14. 
140. Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 248–49. Fire experts 
reviewing the evidence from Willingham’s trial pointed out that “[t]he 
behavior of concrete in fires, including the development of various colors, has 
been extensively studied.” Carpenter et al., supra note 139, at 18. These 
experts concluded that there is simply “no scientific basis for Mr. Vasquez’s 
statement about the brown discoloration being an indication of the presence 
of accelerants.” Id. 
141. Vasquez’s testimony also demonstrated other misconceptions. A common 
one is that arson fires burn hotter and faster than “normal” fires: “You know, 
[an accelerant] makes the fire hotter. It’s not a normal fire.” Willingham 
Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XI, 249. However, the temperature of 
burning wood and burning gasoline are nearly identical, so to claim that a 
fire using liquid accelerants burns “hotter” than a wood fire is wrong. 
Lentini, supra note 117, at 501–02. 
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windows—as an indication of arson.142 Arson investigators long believed 
that crazed glass resulted from a fire that burned fast and hot and that 
the presence of crazed glass indicated that the fire was fueled by a liquid 
accelerant. Yet, subsequent research demonstrated that crazing occurs 
from rapid cooling—rather than rapid heating—when water from fire 
hoses is sprayed on heated windows.143 
In retrospect, one of the numerous debris samples submitted for 
laboratory analysis contributed the most damning piece of evidence.144 
The debris sample—collected from an area near the front door—was 
the only sample that tested positive for a chemical commonly used in 
charcoal lighter fluids.145 This finding can be explained by the fact that 
a charcoal grill and lighter fluid were on the front porch at the time of 
the fire.146 In fact, that the other samples yielded negative results sup-
ported Willingham’s case.147 
Numerous nationally recognized experts reviewed the arson 
testimony presented at Willingham’s trial and found it seriously flawed. 
The first examination of the record by an independent expert was part 
of Willingham’s petition for habeas corpus and was also submitted to 
the governor and the Board of Pardons and Parole days before 
Willingham’s execution. It concluded: “On first reading, a contem-
porary fire origin and cause analyst might well wonder how anyone 
 
142. “The pieces of broken window glass on the ledge of the north windows to 
the northeast bedroom disclosed a crazed ‘spider webbing’ condition. This 
condition is an indication that the fire burned fast and hot.” Carpenter et 
al., supra note 139, at 18 (citing Vasquez’s written report on the Willingham 
fire at 4). 
143. Lentini, supra note 117, at 478 (“It is unclear why anyone ever thought 
that crazing of glass indicated rapid heating.”). 
144. In closing argument, the defense counsel referred to a “dozen samples.” 
Willingham Transcript supra note 122, at vol. XIII, 20. 
145. Id. at vol. XI, 220–21 (documenting testimony by expert stating there was 
“no distinguishing characteristic” in the charcoal lighter fluid from plastic 
container on porch “that was not present” in the front-door threshold sample 
tested); id. at vol. XIII, 20–21 (“They sent [the samples] to the lab and what 
did they find? Nothing, not a trace of anything at all except on the very 
front of the front porch where the charcoal lighter fluid was.”); id. at vol. 
XIII, 45 ( “The [accelerant] is gone, except [on] the threshold; it burned 
away . . . .”). 
146. Id. at vol. XII, 14–15 (noting that, although photographs show a grill, 
Vasquez apparently did not know of the grill’s presence); id. at vol. XII, 16 
(acknowledging that a fire-damaged charcoal lighter fluid container was 
found on the front porch). 
147. The prosecutor would later say that he “‘never did understand why they 
weren’t able to recover’ positive tests in these parts.” Grann, supra note 121. 
At trial, he argued that, except in the threshold, the “liquid . . . burned away 
in that destructive madness created by Cameron Todd Willingham.” 
Willingham Transcript, supra note 122, at vol. XIII, 45. 
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could make so many critical errors in interpreting the evidence.”148 
Nevertheless, a stay was denied, and Willingham was put to death. 
Subsequent evaluators agreed that the trial evidence was junk science. 
For example, five independent experts prepared a forty-three-page re-
port, finding that “each and every one of the indicators relied upon 
have since been scientifically proven to be invalid.”149 
In May 2006, the Innocence Project petitioned the Texas Forensic 
Science Commission to review the arson testimony in Willingham’s and 
Ernest Ray Willis’ cases.150 The TFSC is not authorized to determine 
guilt or innocence. Instead, the Innocence Project argued that the State 
Fire Marshall Office should have reinvestigated arson cases in which its 
experts testified after NFPA 921 was published in 1992—a full twelve 
years before Willingham’s execution.151 TFSC retained its own inde-
pendent consultant, Dr. Craig Beyler, another nationally-recognized 
expert, to review the arson evidence. His fifty-one-page report dissected 
the expert testimony, concluding: 
The investigations of the Willis and Willingham fires did not 
comport with either the modern standard of care expressed by 
NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by fire investigation 
texts and papers in the period 1980-1992. The investigators had 
poor understandings of fire science and failed to acknowledge or 
apply the contemporaneous understanding of the limitations of 
fire indicators. Their methodologies did not comport with the 
scientific method or the process of elimination. A finding of arson 
could not be sustained based upon the standard of care expressed 
by NFPA 921, or the standard of care expressed by fire 
investigation texts and papers in the period 1980–1992.152 
 
148. Report of Dr. Gerald Hurst at 1, Ex parte Willingham, No. 24,4670(B), (Dist. 
Ct. Navarro Cty., Tex., Feb. 13, 2004). 
149. Carpenter et al., supra note 139, at 3. 
150. The expert evidence in both cases was comparable, but Willis was lucky. His 
death penalty conviction was overturned on procedural grounds, and the 
prosecutor subsequently refused to reindict him after Dr. Hurst wrote the 
same type of critical report in Willis’s case that he had written in 
Willingham’s. Willis, who had spent seventeen years on death row, was 
subsequently exonerated on actual innocence grounds. See Mary Alice 
Robbins, New-York Based Innocence Project Attacks Texas Arson 
Convictions, Tex. Law., May 8, 2006, Factiva, Doc. No. 
TEXASL0020060508e2580000l. 
151. See Letter from Innocence Project to Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 
2010) (on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review). 
152. Craig L. Beyler, Analysis of the Fire Investigation Methods and Procedures 
Used in the Criminal Arson Cases Against Ernest Ray Willis and Cameron 
Todd Willingham 51 (Aug. 17, 2009) (unpublished report) (on file with Case 
Western Reserve Law Review). 
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Once Beyler’s report became public, a political firestorm erupted, 
and the governor, who was in the midst of a reelection battle, abruptly 
replaced commission members two days before a meeting was scheduled 
to consider the Beyler report.153 The newly appointed chair, a prose-
cutor, promptly cancelled the meeting,154 raising the specter of a cover-
up.155 Next, the Attorney General issued an opinion finding that the 
TFSC was prohibited “from considering or evaluating specific items of 
evidence that were tested or offered into evidence prior to [its creation 
in 2005].”156 
The TFSC eventually produced a report—one that did not directly 
deal with the Willingham and Willis cases. Nevertheless, the Report’s 
recommendations and statements indicated that the Willingham arson 
 
153. See Christy Hoppe, Perry Defends Removal of 3 Before Arson Hearing, 
Dall. Morning News (Oct. 2, 2009), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/dp-
dallasmorning-perry-defends-removal-of-3-before-arson-hearing-10-02-09.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DRP9-ZZE6] (detailing the removal of the three members 
of the Texas Forensic Science Commission); Mary Alice Robbins, Fired Up; 
Changes Sought for Texas Forensic Science Commission at Center of Heated 
Controversy, Tex. Law., Nov. 9, 2009, Factiva, Doc. No. 
TEXASL0020091109e5b900002 (“[Former Commissioner] Levy says he 
believes ‘things went south’ for the commission after [former Chair] Bassett 
released Beyler’s report to the public in August ‘as he was required by law 
to do.’”). The meeting was scheduled for October 2, 2009. Agenda, Tex. 
Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.fsc.texas.gov/ 
sites/default/files/D_100209MeetingAgenda_000.pdf [https://perma.cc/U 
C8Z-HQMY]. 
154. Hoppe, supra note 153 (noting that the new chair was “known as one of the 
toughest law-and-order prosecutors in the state”). 
155. See Jennifer Emily, Texas Forensic Science Commission Refuses to End 
Inquiry into Willingham Arson Case, Dall. Morning News (Sept. 18, 
2010), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2010/09/18/Texas-Foren 
sic-Science-Commission-refuses-to-5315 [https://perma.cc/3RP5-GSH6] 
(“Perry’s replacements were seen by some as a political maneuver intended 
to change the outcome of the commission’s decision.”); Christy Hoppe, Perry 
Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He’s Assailed as New Chair Delays 
Session on Flawed Case that Led to Execution, Dall. Morning News, Oct. 
1, 2009, at 1A; Dave Mann, Fire and Innocence, Tex. Observer (Dec. 3, 
2009), https://www.texasobserver.org/fire-and-innocence/ [https://perma. 
cc/SB7T-AGYB] (“Then in late September, Perry booted three members off 
of the Texas Forensic Science Commission, which was investigating the 
Willingham and Willis cases, just three days before a crucial hearing on 
scientists’ findings. Perry’s new appointees promptly canceled the hearing 
and have yet to reschedule it. Even conservative commentators cried cover-
up, suggesting that Perry, in a tough battle for re-election, was trying to 
subvert an investigation that might prove he oversaw the execution of an 
innocent man.”). 
156. Letter from Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of Tex., to the Honorable Nizam 
Peerwani, Presiding Officer, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (July 29, 2011), 
https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/50abbott/op/2011/pdf
/ga0866.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SMK-P5MY]. 
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investigation was seriously flawed. Its first recommendation was “that 
fire investigators adhere to the standards of NFPA 921.”157 In addition, 
the report reviewed a number of arson indicators that were used in the 
Willingham and Willis cases. Citing Vasquez’s testimony, the report 
undermined his opinions concerning (1) V-patterns as an indicator of 
origin, (2) pour patterns, (3) low/deep burning, (4) multiple separate 
points of origin, (5) spalling, (6) burn intensity, and (7) crazed glass.158 
It also observed that “testimony, such as Vasquez’s response to a ques-
tion regarding Willingham’s state of mind, is an example of the type of 
testimony that experts should avoid as falling outside of their field of 
expertise.”159 The report even encouraged lawyers to “aggressively pur-
sue admissibility hearings in arson cases.”160 
Despite the opinions of all the independent experts, the State Fire 
Marshal vigorously defended its investigation. In a breathtaking letter, 
the office asserted that “[i]n reviewing documents and standards in 
place then and now, we stand by the original investigator’s report and 
conclusions.”161 This left the TFSC incredulous.162 
2. Han Tak Lee Case 
Unfortunately, Willingham’s case was not an outlier. In the 1989 
trial of Han Tak Lee,163 the expert also relied on the old “myths” to 
declare the fire incendiary: (1) greater intensity and heat, (2) burn 
patterns, (3) alligatoring, (4) melted metal in bed frames, and (5) crazed 
 
157. Report of the Texas Forensic Science Commission: 
Willingham/Willis Investigation 39 (2011) [hereinafter TFSC 
Report]. 
158. Id. at 22–28. 
159. Id. at 36. 
160. Id. at 48. 
161. Letter from Paul Maldonado, State Fire Marshal, to Leigh Tomlin, Comm’n 
Coordinator, Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n (Aug. 20, 2010) (on file with Case 
Western Reserve Law Review) (emphasis added). 
162. TFSC Report, supra note 157, at 16 (“This appears to be an untenable 
position in light of advances in fire science. The fires in these cases occurred 
two decades ago; there are few circumstances in which an investigation could 
not be improved with the benefit of twenty years of controlled scientific 
experiment and practical experience.”). 
163. Lee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in 2010, based in part on 
“inaccurate and unreliable evidence.” Lee v. Tennis, No. 4:CV-08-1972, 2010 
WL 3812160, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010). Although the district court 
denied Lee’s petition, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case to 
the district court. Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 407–08 (3d Cir. 2012) (“If 
Lee’s expert’s independent analysis of the fire scene evidence—applying 
principles from new developments in fire science—shows that the fire expert 
testimony at Lee’s trial was fundamentally unreliable, then Lee will be 
entitled to federal habeas relief on his due process claim.”). 
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glass.164 In addition, the investigation was “hobbled by an incomplete 
and inaccurate understanding” of flashover.165 After serving twenty-five 
years, Lee was released from prison in 2014.166 
3. National Fire Protection Association Guidelines 
After the publication of NFPA 921 in 1992, the kind of testimony 
presented in the Willingham and Lee cases should have vanished from 
the courtroom. But arson investigators balked. According to one expert, 
“[t]he initial response to NFPA 921 in the fire investigation community 
was overwhelmingly negative.”167 Babick v. Berghuis168 is illustrative. In 
that case, Andrew Babick was convicted of arson-murder for a 1995 
house fire and was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.169 He later sought habeas relief, claiming in-
effective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. In 2010, 
the Sixth Circuit rejected these claims.170 
In dissent, however, Judge Merritt chastised the defense attorney 
for not contesting the arson evidence in “this strange junk science 
case.”171 One prosecution expert testified that: (1) char marks on the 
porch were evidence of an accelerant, (2) a “line of demarcation” in a 
burn pattern on a carpet was “suspicious” because “it should not have 
burned the carpeting on these jagged edges,” and (3) the burns were 
“not normal” and were “unnatural.”172 Another prosecution expert  
 
 
 
 
164. Lee v. Tennis, Civil No. 4:08-CV-1972, 2014 WL 3894306, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 
June 13, 2014), adopted, 2014 WL 3900230 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2014), aff’d 
sub nom. Lee v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2015). 
165. Id. 
166. Mark Hansen, Badly Burned: Long-Held Beliefs About Arson Science Have 
Been Debunked After Decades of Misuse and Scores of Wrongful 
Convictions, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2015, at 37, 37, 43. 
167. Id. at 40. 
168. 620 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2010). See generally Marc Price Wolf, Habeas Relief 
from Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for Prisoners 
Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 Minn. J.L. Sci. & 
Tech. 213 (2009) (detailing the shift of the principles in the field of fire 
investigation and how past convictions may use habeas relief). 
169. Id. at 574. 
170. Id. at 580. 
171. 620 F.3d at 580, 582–83 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
172. Id. at 581 (quoting transcript). 
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stated that “low burning” and other “unnatural” patterns indicated the 
presence of an accelerant.173 Both experts “testified—in direct contrast 
to the NFPA guide—that they were so confident in their reading of 
burn patterns that the absence of any laboratory confirmation of 
accelerant had no effect on their testimony.”174 
4. Dog-Sniff Evidence 
More alarming, in Judge Merritt’s view, was dog-sniff evidence.175 
The NFPA guide provides: “Research has shown that canines have been 
alerted to pyrolysis products that are not produced by an ignitable liq-
uid” and a positive canine alert without laboratory confirmation 
“should not be considered validated.”176 The lab tests had not detected 
accelerants in the house debris. Yet, a dog handler testified that “his 
dog, Samantha, was ‘1000 times’ more effective at detecting fire starters 
or liquid accelerants than a laboratory test on burnt material.”177 In 
short, the “jury was misled into trusting Samantha over the arson fo-
rensic lab.”178 
A more recent arson-dog case involved James Hebshie, who was 
convicted of arson and mail fraud in 2006. A federal district court 
granted his habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel 
grounds.179 In the court’s view, if a Daubert hearing had been requested 
on the canine evidence, there was a “‘reasonable probability’ that the  
Court would have excluded the canine testimony or severely limited 
it.”180 Without a challenge from the defense, the dog handler testified  
 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 580. 
176. NFPA 921, supra note 119, § 17.5.4.7 (describing the role of canine 
investigations as “assisting with the location and collection of samples” for 
laboratory testing). 
177. Babick, 620 F.3d at 580. 
178. Id. at 581. See also United States v. Myers, No. 3:10-00039, 2010 WL 
2723196, at *3–4 (S.D.W. Va. July 8, 2010) (granting motion in limine to 
prohibit expert testimony of a canine handler because the alert had not been 
confirmed by lab testing, conflicted with the Fire Guide, and did not meet 
the Daubert standards). 
179. United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 128 (D. Mass. 2010). 
180. Id. at 124 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
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that his dog, Billy, “was 97% accurate.”181 Indeed, the handler testified 
to “an almost mystical account of Billy’s powers and her unique olfac-
tory capabilities.”182 The court explained: 
[The handler] went on and on about what he understood about 
Billy, as if his relationship with Billy somehow enhanced the 
reliability and probative value of the results—that she was 
unique, that he could “read her face,” that he was with her 365 
days a year, that he knew her personality, “the way her eyes 
shifted,” the ways her ear shifted, etc.183 
Moreover, the handler focused on one area as the origin of the fire 
and testified that the dog had not alerted anywhere else on the prem-
ises. However, the handler had limited the dog’s access to that one 
area.184 In addition, a dog’s failure to alert has no evidential value: 
“[T]he scientific literature cast doubt on the significance of the dog’s 
failure to alert (false negatives) and even raised concerns about canine 
‘proficiency’ testing, concerns counsel never raised.”185 Indeed, the term 
“accelerant-detection” dog was misleading because the dog is trained to 
alert to many common materials that are not accelerants; the site of 
the fire was a convenience store which sold lighter fluid and lighters.186 
5. Post-Daubert Cases 
The courts’ response to bogus arson evidence is mixed.187 It is not 
hard to find cases citing discredited arson indicators after Daubert, such 
 
181. Id. at 102; see also Michael E. Kurz et al., Effect of Background Interference 
on Accelerant Detection by Canines, 41 J. Forensic Scis. 868, 872 (1996) 
(noting the varying levels of reliability in accelerant detection depending on 
the substance in question and the canine handler); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 518, 520 (Ark. 2000) (affirming the trial 
court’s exclusion of a canine handler who sought to testify about “the alleged 
superior ability of his canine partner, Benjamin, to detect the presence of 
accelerants after a fire . . . [that he could] discriminate between different 
types of chemicals,” and that he had an “accuracy rate of 100 percent”). 
182. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 93–94. 
183. Id. at 120. 
184. Id. at 94. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 93, 96–97. 
187. 2 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 26.07[b], at 1102–03 (“Many appellate 
courts continue to routinely accept investigators’ testimony about 
experientially-based generalizations . . . .”). 
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as pour patterns or puddle configurations,188 melted bedsprings,189 con-
crete spalling,190 fire load,191 and “fast and hot” burn.192 Decided in 1998, 
Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Corp. v. Benfield193 is considered 
the “first serious challenge to the ‘old school’ of fire investigators.”194 In 
that case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that arson testimony “is subject 
 
188. See, e.g., State v. Allen, No. 22835, 2009 WL 2096295, ¶ 114 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 17, 2009) (noting that investigator testified to “an irregular burn 
pattern on the floor which through all my experience and training it appears 
to be an irregular pour patterns [sic], an ignitable liquid pour pattern”); State 
v. Wolf, 891 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a firefighter 
testified “he observed ‘pour patterns’ located on the floor throughout the 
mobile home; that pour patterns are burnt marks that look like puddles that 
result from ignitable liquids . . . being poured out of containers . . .”); Colburn 
v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 209–10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (“This pour pattern, 
[the fire investigator] explained, was indicative of flammable liquid being 
poured in the area . . . . On cross-examination [the fire investigator] did 
admit that the State Crime Laboratory was unable to identify ignitable 
liquids in the three debris samples taken from the pour pattern area.”); State 
v. Henderson, 125 P.3d 1132, 1137 (Mont. 2005) (finding that the trial court 
“did not err in allowing [a firefighter] to identify in the photographs and 
diagrams the pour patterns he had observed at the scene”). 
189. Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 409 (Miss. 1993), vacated, 513 U.S. 956 
(1994) (mem.). 
190. See, e.g., State v. Amodio, 915 A.2d 569, 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007) (“They washed the floor and observed areas of spalling in the concrete 
underneath the door. This was an indication that a flammable liquid had 
been employed in that area.”); McCord v. Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co., 698 So. 
2d 89, 95 (Miss. 1997) (“The arson investigator . . . testified that he found 
five different areas of spalling and concluded arson to be the cause of the 
fire.”). 
191. See, e.g., Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1200 (Ind. 1999) (noting that a 
fire investigator testified that a fire was intentionally set based on several 
factors, including that “the fire burned too fast for its fuel load”); Carter v. 
State, 516 S.E.2d 556, 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“[The arson investigator] 
deduced there must have been an accelerant or some kind of extra fuel 
load.”). 
192. See, e.g., People v. Klait, No. 289522, 2010 WL 2076956, at *5 (Mich. Ct. 
App. May 25, 2010) (“[B]oth [investigators] testified that they believed, 
based on the fast and hot nature of the fire, that it was set intentionally.”); 
State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 858 (Idaho 1990) (noting that a fire 
investigator testified that “it was a hot, fast fire as opposed to a small or as 
opposed to a slow, smoldering fire, yes, the evidence suggests to me that it 
was deliberately set”); State v. Cutlip, No. 99-L-149, 2001 WL 687493, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (noting that a fire department lieutenant testified to 
a list of factors including that “the fire was fast and hot” and “that such 
observations are typical of a fire started by someone pouring an accelerant 
and lighting it”). 
193. 140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998). 
194. John J. Lentini, The Evolution of Fire Investigations and Its Impact on 
Arson Cases, 27 Crim. Just. 12, 14 (2012). 
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to Daubert’s inquiry regarding the reliability of such testimony.”195 
Some federal courts after Benfield cited NFPA 921.196 Yet, a 2011 article 
on the subject began with the passage: “Fire researchers have shattered 
dozens of arson myths in recent years. So why do American courts still 
lag behind?”197 And a 2013 survey of 586 public sector fire investigators 
found that some myths endure: “Nearly 40 percent did not know that 
crazed glass is caused by rapid cooling, not rapid heating. Twenty-three 
percent think puddle-shaped burns indicate the use of an accelerant. 
Eight percent still believe that alligator blistering implies that a fire 
burned fast and hot.”198 
The TFSC Report did more than the courts to curb flawed arson 
testimony. And it took the execution of an innocent man to trigger that 
report.199 In addition, the resistance to change is all-too-familiar: Rules 
based on science “were slow to take hold, as veteran investigators clung 
to what now are considered disproven theories. In some police and fire 
departments, investigators were openly hostile to the updated 
science.”200 
D. Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
For more than three decades, FBI experts testified about Compar-
ative Bullet Lead Analysis (“CBLA”), a technique first used in the 
investigation into President Kennedy’s assassination.201 CBLA 
compares trace chemicals found in bullets at crime scenes with ammu-
 
195. Benfield, 140 F.3d at 920. 
196. See e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 394 F.3d 1054, 1058 
(8th Cir. 2005) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion where 
the court concluded that evidentiary support of arson theory advanced by 
experts was inadequate because they did not examine their theory “against 
empirical data obtained from fire scene analysis and appropriate testing,” in 
violation of NFPA 921); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 
850–51 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (holding that cause-and-origin expert’s failure to 
properly collect evidence violated NFPA 921). 
197. Douglas Starr, Up in Smoke, Discover, Nov. 2011, at 36, 37. 
198. Hansen, supra note 166, at 42–43. 
199. For a fuller discussion of the Cameron Todd Willingham case, see Giannelli, 
supra note 117. 
200. See Steve Mills, Convicted Murderer Hopes Latest Fire Science Proves 
Innocence, Chi. Trib. (May 18, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-arson-science-adam-gray-met-20150518-story.html [https://perma. 
cc/B4XF-FMTN]. 
201. See generally Erik Randich & Patrick M. Grant, Proper Assessment of the 
JFK Assassination Bullet Lead Evidence from Metallurgical and Statistical 
Perspectives, 51 J. Forensic Sci. 717 (2006) (discussing the original 
analysis of the bullet fragments); Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic 
Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 53, 81 (2011). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure 
902 
nition found in a suspect’s possession. This technique was used when 
firearms or “ballistics” identification could not be employed. FBI ex-
perts used various analytical techniques, first neutron activation anal-
ysis (“NAA”), and then inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission 
spectrometry (“ICP-AES”), to determine the concentration levels of 
seven elements—arsenic, antimony, tin, copper, bismuth, silver, and 
cadmium—in the bullet lead alloy of the suspect’s bullets and those 
recovered from the crime scene. Statistical tests were then used to 
compare the elements in each bullet and determine whether the frag-
ments and suspect’s bullets were “analytically indistinguishable” for 
each of the elemental concentration averages. Exactly what the phrase 
“analytically indistinguishable” meant was the main issue—i.e., did 
such a finding mean that the bullet fragments came from a small or 
large universe? Obviously, the probative value of the test results would 
differ if only a hundred bullets had the same chemical composition as 
opposed to several million. 
The published cases revealed disparate and often inconsistent inter-
pretive conclusions provided by FBI experts. In some, experts testified 
that two exhibits were “analytically indistinguishable.”202 In other cases, 
examiners concluded that samples could have come from the same 
“source” or “batch.”203 In still others, they stated that the samples came 
from the same source.204 The testimony in numerous cases went much 
further and referred to a “box” of ammunition—typically fifty loaded 
cartridges, sometimes twenty. For example, two specimens: 
(1) Could have come from the same box;205 
(2) Could have come from the same box or a box manufactured 
on the same day;206 
(3) Were consistent with their having come from the same box of 
ammunition;207 
(4) Probably came from the same box;208 or 
 
202. See Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
203. See State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Or. 1974) (en banc). 
204. See United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 673–74 (8th Cir. 1996); People v. 
Lane, 628 N.E.2d 682, 689–90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
205. See State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State, 
425 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ind. 1981). 
206. See State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994); People v. Johnson, 
499 N.E.2d 1355, 1366 (Ill. 1986). 
207. See State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982). 
208. See Bryan v. State, 935 P.2d 338, 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
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(5) Must have come from the same box or from another box that 
would have been made by the same company on the same day.209 
Several other statements that differ appear in the published opin-
ions. An early case reported that the specimens “had come from the 
same batch of ammunition: they had been made by the same manu-
facturer on the same day and at the same hour.”210 One case reports 
the expert’s conclusion with a statistic.211 In another case, the expert 
used the expressions “such a finding is rare”212 and “a very rare 
finding.”213 In still another case, the expert “opined that the same 
company produced the bullets at the same time, using the same lead 
source. Based upon DOJ records, she opined that an overseas company 
called PMC produced the bullets around 1982.”214 
1. NAS Bullet Lead Report (2004) 
The technique was not seriously challenged until a retired FBI 
examiner, William Tobin, began questioning the procedure in scientific 
 
209. See Davis, 103 F.3d at 666 (“An expert testified that such a finding is rare 
and that the bullets must have come from the same box or from another box 
that would have been made by the same company on the same day.”); 
Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194, 207 (Mass. 1992); State v. King, 
546 S.E.2d 575, 584 (N.C. 2001) (“[The expert] opined that, based on her 
lead analysis, the bullets she examined either came from the same box of 
cartridges or came from different boxes of the same caliber, manufactured at 
the same time.”). 
210. Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221, 224 (Alaska 1979) (emphasis added). 
211. Earhart v. State, 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc); 
see also Giannelli, supra note 201, at 83 n.200. 
212. Davis, 103 F.3d at 666. 
213. Id. at 667. 
214. People v. Villarta, No. H021354, 2002 WL 66887, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan, 
17, 2002). In later years, the testimony became more limited. A 2002 FBI 
publication states the conclusion as follows: “Therefore, they likely originated 
from the same manufacturer’s source (melt) of lead.” Charles A. Peters, The 
Basis for Compositional Bullet Lead Comparisons, Forensic Sci. 
Commc’ns (July 2002) (emphasis added), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/ 
about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/july2002/peters.htm [https 
://perma.cc/889Y-4TGL]. Testimony to the same effect has also been 
proffered. Transcript of Record at 6, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. 
00CR2727 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 28, 2002) (trial testimony of 
Charles Peters, FBI examiner) (“Well, bullets that are analytically 
indistinguishable likely come from the same molten lead sources of lead, uh, 
as opposed to bullets that have different composition come from different, 
uh, melts of lead.”). 
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and legal journals215 as well as in court testimony.216 As a result, the 
FBI asked the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) to review the 
technique. The 2004 NAS Report undercut the FBI testimony, stating: 
“The available data do not support any statement that a crime bullet 
came from a particular box of ammunition. In particular, references to 
‘boxes’ of ammunition in any form should be avoided as misleading un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”217 Perhaps the most disturbing case 
is State v. Earhart,218 a capital murder case in which the CBLA evidence 
apparently played a significant role.219 The transcript contains the fol-
lowing expert testimony: “We can—from my 21 years experience of 
doing bullet lead analysis and doing research on boxes of ammunition 
down through the years I can determine if bullets came from the same 
box of ammunition . . . .”220 However, the NAS Report found that the 
 
215. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis (CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inference or Ipse Dixit?, 28 Okla. City 
U. L. Rev. 43 (2003); Erik Randich, Wayne Duefeldt, Wade McLendon & 
William Tobin, A Metallurgical Review of the Interpretation of Bullet Lead 
Compositional Analysis, 127 Forensic Sci. Int’l 174 (2002); William A. 
Tobin & Wayne Duerfeldt, How Probative Is Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis?, Crim. Just., Fall 2002, at 26; Paul C. Giannelli, Comparative 
Bullet Lead Analysis: A Retrospective, 47 Crim. L. Bull. 306 (2010). 
216. E.g., Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 577 (Ky. 2006); Clemons 
v. State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1068–70 (Md. 2006); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 
339–42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (quoting Tobin’s affidavit 
submitted with motion for reconsideration). 
217. Comm. on Sci. Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition 
Comparison, Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Acads., 
Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 7 (2004) 
[hereinafter NAS Report]. The author served on the NAS Committee. 
218. 823 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (“[The expert] 
concluded that the likelihood that two .22 caliber bullets came from the same 
batch, based on all the .22 bullets made in one year, is approximately .000025 
percent, ‘give or take a zero.’ He subsequently acknowledged, however, that 
the numbers which he used to reach the .000025 percent statistic failed to 
take into account that there are different types of .22 caliber bullets made 
each year—.22, .22 long, and .22 long rifle. [The expert] ultimately testified 
that there could be several hundred thousand bullets per batch, but with 
some variation in the elemental composition within the batch.”). 
219. See Earhart v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1062, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Given the 
significant role the bullet evidence played in the prosecution’s case, we shall 
therefore assume Earhart could have made a sufficient threshold showing 
that he was entitled to a defense expert under Texas law.”). 
220. Transcript of Record at 5248-49, State v. Earhart, No. 4064, Dist. Ct. Lee 
County, 21st Judicial Dist., Texas (testimony of John Riley); see also id. at 
5258 (“Well, bullets that are—that have analytically indistinguishable 
compositions or compositions that are generally similar typically are found 
within the same box of ammunition and that is the case that we have here. 
Now, bullets that are the same composition can also be found in other boxes 
of ammunition, but it’s most likely those boxes would have been 
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amount of bullets that can be produced from a melt “can range from 
the equivalent of as few as 12,000 to as many as 35 million 40-grain, 
.22 caliber longrifle bullets . . . .”221 Earhart was executed before the 
report was published.222 
2. Post-Report Developments 
Much of the FBI testimony rested on a database, which the Bureau 
had built up over the span of several years. Although the NAS com-
mittee frequently asked for this data during its year-long investigation, 
the FBI did not turn it over until it was too late to analyze for its 
report.223 The two statisticians who served on the NAS committee later 
wrote that their subsequent inspection of the data “identified several 
peculiarities.”224 First, the database was incomplete. The FBI claimed 
to have a “complete data file” of some 71,000+ measurements, but it 
only turned over 64,869. Moreover, only ICP-AES’s measurements were 
included; a different analytical method—NAA—had been used before 
1997. Both techniques measured the same elements, and thus the results 
from either technique would have been appropriate for comparison. 
Additionally, the numbering system for the bullets was “highly incon-
sistent and rather unexpected,” suggesting that some bullet meas-
urements were deleted.225 Additionally, “a rough investigation of the 
 
manufactured at the same place on or about the same date.”). But see 
testimony of Charles Peters, FBI examiner, Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 
Kentucky, Feb. 28, 2002 (testifying during a Daubert hearing: “We have 
never testified, to my knowledge, that that bullet came from that box. We’d 
never say that. All we are testifying is that bullet, or that victim fragment 
or something, the bullet, either came from that box or the many boxes that 
were produced at the same time.” Transcript at 1-2 (emphasis added)). 
221. NAS Report, supra note 217, at 6. 
222. See James Earhart, Death Penalty Info. Ctr., https://deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/james-earhart [https://perma.cc/2KUJ-QK7X] (last visited Oct. 15, 
2017). 
223. See Clifford H. Spiegelman & Karen Kafadar, Data Integrity and the 
Scientific Method: The Case of Bullet Lead Data as Forensic Evidence, 19 
Chance, no. 2, 2006, at 17, 22 (“During the open sessions of the committee 
meetings, the FBI claimed to have a ‘complete data file’ of some 71,000+ 
measurements. Following repeated requests from the Committee, the FBI 
submitted at its last meeting a CD-ROM that contained two data files with 
a combined total of 64,869 bullet (not 71,000+) measurement records. This 
data set could not be analyzed in time for the release of the report . . . .”); 
Giannelli, supra note 215. 
224. Spiegelman & Kafadar, supra note 223, at 17, 22. 
225. Id. (“[T]he numbering system of the bullets was highly inconsistent and 
rather unexpected (e.g., the bullets from a suspect in a particular case might 
be numbered Q13A, Q13B, Q13C, Q14A, Q14B, Q14C, . . . leading one to 
wonder what happened to bullets Q01, Q02, . . . Q12).” (omissions in 
original)). Other illustrations of incomplete data were noted: “[W]hile most 
of the bullets indicated three measurements, about 30 bullets had six or more 
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measurement error indicated many measurement errors that exceeded 
the FBI’s claimed analytical precision of 2–5%.”226 Finally, “only 15% 
of the 1,079 cases listed in these two files had measurements from 
[National Institute of Standards and Technology] . . . making it 
impossible to determine the frequency of matches . . . in a case.”227 
Accordingly, the “missing data and the inconsistent precisions” under-
mined the Bureau’s public claims.228 These authors were puzzled by the 
FBI’s failure to disclose data: “The scientific method is important for 
science generally; forensic science is no exception. . . . [T]he evidence in 
this paper suggests that, at least for [CBLA], forensic science failed in 
the requirement to share the material, methods, and data to reach con-
clusions with the scientific community.”229 
The FBI’s response to the NAS Report was also troubling. The 
Bureau quickly put out a press release, obscuring the report’s find-
ings.230 The release highlighted the committee’s conclusion that the FBI 
was using appropriate instrumentation and suitable elements for com-
parison. Yet, these aspects of CBLA were never seriously questioned. 
Rather, the interpretation of the data was disputed. Only one sentence 
in the press release addressed this critical issue: “Recommendations by 
the [NAS] included suggestions to improve the statistical analysis, qual-
ity control procedures, as well as expert testimony.”231 The news media 
read the report quite differently—e.g., “Study Shoots Holes in Bullet 
Analyses by FBI,”232 “Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis,”233 
 
measurements. . . . [O]nly about 50% of the bullets in this data set were 
identified as having come from one of the four major bullet manufacturers 
in the United States [i.e., Cascade Cartridge, Inc.; Federal; Remington; 
Winchester]; the ‘complete data file’ of 71,000 bullets may yield a higher 
proportion of bullets from these four manufacturers.” Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 24; see also Giannelli, supra note 215. 
230. FBI Nat’l Press Office, National Academy of Sciences Releases FBI-
Commissioned Study on Bullet Lead Analysis, FBI (Feb. 10, 2004), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/pressrel/press-releases/national-acade 
my-of-sciences-releases-fbi-commissioned-study-on-bullet-lead-analysis [https: 
//perma.cc/8SXR-2PSV]. 
231. Id. 
232. Maurice Possley, Study Shoots Holes in Bullet Analyses by FBI, Chi. Trib. 
(Feb. 11, 2004), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-02-11/news/0402 
110356_1_bullet-analysis-bullet-lead-analysis-bullet-comparisons [https:// 
perma.cc/Z59B-UZ5T]. 
233. Charles Piller, Report Finds Flaws in FBI Bullet Analysis: Changes Are 
Proposed for the Technique Often Cited in Expert Testimony in Criminal 
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“FBI Lab Under Scrutiny Again,”234 and “Report Questions the 
Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test.”235 
The Bureau also included the following passage in the press release: 
“The basis of bullet lead compositional analysis is supported by 
approximately 50 peer-reviewed articles found in scientific publications 
beginning in the early 1970’s. Published research and validation studies 
have continued to demonstrate the usefulness of the measurements of 
trace elements within bullet lead.”236 In contrast, the NAS Report 
pointed out that there were “very few peer-reviewed articles on 
homogeneity and the rate of false positive matches” and “[o]utside 
reviews have only recently been published.”237 
Over a year later, the FBI discontinued CBLA testing238 and issued 
another, similar press release. Once again, the release minimized the 
problems, citing the following reason for its decision: “While the FBI 
Laboratory still firmly supports the scientific foundation of bullet lead 
analysis, given the costs of maintaining the equipment, the resources 
necessary to do the examination, and its relative probative value, the 
FBI Laboratory has decided that it will no longer conduct this exam.”239 
Nevertheless, Dwight Adams, the laboratory director, had written a 
private memorandum to the FBI Director a month earlier specifying 
different reasons for abandoning the technique, including the following 
comments: (1) “We cannot afford to be misleading to a jury” and (2) 
“We plan to discourage prosecutors from using our previous results in 
future cases.”240 The press release did not reflect either concern. 
 
Trials, L.A. Times (Feb. 11, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/ 
11/science/sci-bullet11 [https://perma.cc/4QHZ-G4QM]. 
234. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, FBI Lab Under Scrutiny Again, Associated 
Press (Feb. 10, 2004, 1:26 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-lab-
under-scrutiny-again/ [https://perma.cc/PG9K-VGWL]. 
235. Eric Lichtblau, Report Questions the Reliability of an F.B.I. Ballistics Test, 
N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/us/ 
report-questions-the-reliability-of-an-fbi-ballistics-test.html [https://perma. 
cc/N7JC-RF6P]. 
236. FBI Nat’l Press Office, supra note 230. 
237. NAS Report, supra note 217, at 100. 
238. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Abandons Disputed Test for Bullets from Crime 
Scenes, N.Y. Times (Sept. 2, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/02/ 
politics/fbi-abandons-disputed-test-for-bullets-from-crime-scenes.html [https 
://perma.cc/4JLF-GCWW]. 
239. Press Release, FBI, FBI Laboratory Announces Discontinuation of Bullet 
Lead Examinations (Sept. 1, 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/ 
pressrel/press-releases/fbi-laboratory-announces-discontinuation-of-bullet-lead 
-examinations [https://perma.cc/QMY5-7MBF]). 
240. John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/ 
17/AR2007111701681.html [https://perma.cc/YGJ2-8ZK4]. 
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In the wake of the NAS Report, several state courts excluded CBLA 
evidence.241 Surprisingly, the FBI supplied affidavits in several cases 
supporting prosecutors’ efforts to sustain convictions based on the 
technique. In one affidavit, the FBI cited the NAS report but ignored 
that the report had faulted the Bureau’s statistical methods. The chair 
of the NAS committee criticized the affidavit because it did “not discuss 
the statistical bullet-matching technique, which is key and probably the 
most significant scientific flaw found by the committee.”242 The affidavit 
was also misleading because it estimated that the maximum number of 
.22-caliber bullets in a batch of lead was 1.3 million, when the NAS 
committee found that the number could be as high as 35 million.243 
On November 18, 2007, 60 Minutes aired a segment on CBLA.244 In 
an interview, the now-retired FBI lab director acknowledged that 
testimony about boxes was “misleading and inappropriate.”245 That 
broadcast, along with a Washington Post investigation, questioned the 
FBI’s response to the NAS Report. The main problem was that only 
the FBI had records of all the cases in which its experts had testified, 
and the Bureau had declined to disclose the names of those cases.246 
 
241. See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 580 (Ky. 2006) (noting 
that “[i]f the FBI Laboratory that produced the CBLA evidence now 
considers such evidence to be of insufficient reliability to justify continuing 
to produce it, a finding by the trial court that the evidence is both 
scientifically reliable and relevant would be clearly erroneous”); Clemons v. 
State, 896 A.2d 1059, 1070, 1078 (Md. 2006) (“CBLA is not admissible under 
the Frye-Reed standard because it is not generally accepted within the 
scientific community as valid and reliable.”; “Based on the criticism of the 
processes and assumptions underlying CBLA, we determine that the trial 
court erred in admitting expert testimony based on CBLA because of the 
lack of general acceptance of the process in the scientific community.”); State 
v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding the technique was 
“based on erroneous scientific foundations”). But see Commonwealth v. 
Fisher, 870 A.2d 864, 871 (Pa. 2005) (“The CBLA evidence, at best, 
established a possible connection between Appellant and the bullets 
recovered from the victim’s body.”); see also United States v. Davis, 406 
F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Davis’s trial counsel cannot be said to be 
ineffective for failing to challenge the FBI’s methodology on a basis that was 
not advanced by the scientific community at the time of trial.”). 
242. John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, Wash. Post (Nov. 18, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/ 
17/AR2007111701681_5.html?sid=ST2007111701983 [https://perma.cc/F 
KM4-L4WQ] (quoting Kenneth MacFadden). 
243. Id. 
244. 60 Minutes: Evidence of Injustice (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 16, 2007), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4g62cpRz7M [https://perma.cc/XC 
7E-E5HP]. 
245. Id. at 5:26. 
246. Solomon, supra note 242 (“Hundreds of defendants sitting in prisons 
nationwide have been convicted with the help of an FBI forensic tool that 
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Instead, the Bureau relied on the NAS Report, its own press releases, 
and pro forma letters sent to prosecution and defense organizations to 
notify defendants. This method of communication was grossly inad-
equate because the letters neither highlighted the problem, nor its sig-
nificance.247 A few days after the 60 Minutes expose, Senator Patrick 
Leahy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, sent a letter 
to the FBI Director noting that the Bureau’s letters gave “the false im-
pression that these discredited tests had continuing reliability.”248 
Here, the flaws are many: Lack of foundational research, failure to 
make a database available to outside scientists, and ignoring the FBI’s 
own protocols by presenting inconsistent and misleading testimony. 
Moreover, the reluctance to confess error and take timely corrective 
action violated basic scientific norms. After decades of use, a federal 
district court in 2003 excluded CBLA evidence under the Daubert 
standard for the first time.249 
II. Misleadingly Presented Techniques 
A. Firearms & Toolmark Identifications 
Firearms identifications, popularly known as “ballistics,” is another 
long-established forensic discipline. It developed in the early part of the 
last century, and by the 1930s courts were admitting evidence based on 
this technique. “Subsequent cases have followed these precedents, 
admitting evidence of bullet, cartridge case, and shot shell iden-
 
was discarded more than two years ago. But the FBI lab has yet to take 
steps to alert the affected defendants or courts, even as the window for 
appealing convictions is closing . . . .”). 
247. The Innocence Network and the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers formed a task force and worked with the FBI to contact defense 
attorneys and convicts. See Vesna Jaksic, Faulty Bullet-Test Cases Finding 
Way to Court, Nat’l L.J. (Feb. 25, 2008), http://lethal-injection-
florida.blogspot.com/2008/02/faulty-bullet-test-cases-finding-way-to.html 
[https://perma.cc/PH7J-LTY9] (“The task force is lining up pro bono 
commitments from several law firms to handle the cases.”). 
248. John Solomon, Leahy Pursues Forensic-Test Answers: Attorney General Is 
Told to Prepare For Senate Inquiry, Wash. Post (Nov. 22, 2007), 
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-washington-post/20071122/2815394 
01609068 [https://perma.cc/BKY5-SFFH] (quoting Leahy). Leahy also 
wrote: “The new revelations about bullet-lead analysis are just the latest 
examples of the Department’s inadequate efforts to ensure that sound 
forensic testing is utilized to the maximum extent to find the guilty rather 
than merely obtain a conviction. Punishing the innocent is wrong and allows 
the guilty party to remain free.” Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 215. 
249. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003 WL 22922197, at *4–5 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 9, 2003). 
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tifications.”250 Toolmark comparison, a related discipline, was also ac-
cepted during this period.251 At the time Daubert was decided, the FBI’s 
position was clear: “Firearms identification is the Forensic Science dis-
cipline that identifies a bullet, cartridge case or other ammunition com-
ponent as having been fired by a particular firearm to the exclusion of 
all other firearms.”252 Yet, the examination, by means of a comparison 
microscope, is subjective and without a meaningful standard. 
1. Post-Daubert Cases 
The courts gave short shrift to the initial post-Daubert challenges 
to firearms and toolmark identifications.253 In 2005, however, the legal 
landscape changed abruptly. In United States v. Green,254 the district 
judge questioned the foundational basis of firearms identifications. The 
court wrote that the expert “declared that this match could be made 
‘to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.’ . . . That con-
clusion, needless to say, is extraordinary, particularly given [his] data 
and methods.”255 Moreover, the expert could not cite any reliable error 
rates and admitted that he relied mainly on his subjective judgment. 
In addition, “[t]here were no reference materials of any specificity, no 
national or even local database on which he relied. And although he 
relied on his past experience with these weapons, he had no notes or 
pictures memorializing his past observations.”256 In the end, the court 
restricted the expert’s testimony; he could only explain the ways in 
which the casings were similar but not that they came from a specific 
weapon “to the exclusion of every other firearm in the world.”257 In the 
court’s view, that conclusion “stretches well beyond [the expert’s] data 
and methodology.”258 
 
250. 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, § 14.06, at 772 (citations omitted). 
251. Id. at § 14.12. 
252. FBI Handbook of Forensic Science 57 (rev. ed. 1994) (emphasis added). 
253. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that “the matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has 
been a recognized method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades”); 
United States v. Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004) 
(“Ballistics evidence has been accepted in criminal cases for many 
years. . . . In the years since Daubert, numerous cases have confirmed the 
reliability of ballistics identification.”); United States v. Santiago, 199 F. 
Supp. 2d 101, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court has not found a single case 
in this Circuit that would suggest that the entire field of ballistics 
identification is unreliable.”). 
254. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
255. Id. at 107. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 109. 
258. Id. 
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A few weeks later, a different district judge in United States v. 
Monteiro259 found that the technique “is largely a subjective determi-
nation based on experience and expertise.”260 Importantly, the court 
also concluded that the theory on which the expert relied was “tautol-
ogical.”261 The Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners 
(“AFTE”), the leading organization of examiners, proposed the 
theory.262 Under this theory, the examiner may declare a positive 
identification if (1) there is “sufficient agreement” of marks between the 
crime scene and test bullets; and (2) there is “sufficient agreement” 
when the examiner says there is.263 In short, the “sufficient agreement” 
threshold is “in the minds eye of the examiner and is based largely on 
training and experience.”264 The court would not admit the evidence 
unless the expert could better document the examination. 
Together, Green and Monteiro should have served as a shot across 
the bow. But they did not; courts continued to admit the same evidence 
as before.265 
 
259. 407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006). 
260. Id. at 355. 
261. Id. at 370. 
262. See Theory of Identification, Association of Firearm and Toolmark 
Examiners, 30 AFTE J. 86, 86 (1998). 
263. See Itiel E. Dror, How Can Francis Bacon Help Forensic Science? The Four 
Idols of Human Biases, 50 Jurimetrics 93, 104 (2009) (“The potential 
problem here is the nonscientific nature of the identification criteria. If the 
comparison of toolmarks enables conclusions about common origin when the 
unique surface contours of two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement,’ what 
is the scientific definition and measurement of what constitutes such 
‘sufficient agreement’? It seems that it is more in the eye of the beholder 
than strict scientific measures because it is determined without specific 
quantification and criteria.”). 
264. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 370 (quoting Richard Grzybowski et al., 
Firearm/Toolmark Identification: Passing the Reliability Test Under Federal 
and State Evidentiary Standards, 25 AFTE J. 209, 213 (2003)). 
265. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(upholding admissibility of firearms identification evidence); United States 
v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (“According to his 
testimony, these toolmarks were sufficiently similar to allow him to identify 
Defendant’s gun as the gun that fired the cartridge found at the crime scene. 
He opined that he held this opinion to a 100% degree of certainty. . . . The 
Court also finds [the expert’s] opinions reliable and based upon a 
scientifically valid methodology. Evidence was presented at the hearing that 
the toolmark testing methodology he employed has been tested, has been 
subjected to peer review, has an ascertainable error rate, and is generally 
accepted in the scientific community.”). 
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2. NAS Ballistic Imaging Report (2008) 
In 2008, NAS published a report on computer imaging of bullets.266 
Although firearms identification was not the primary focus of the 
investigation, a section of the report commented on the subject.267 After 
surveying the literature on uniqueness, reproducibility, and permanence 
of individual characteristics, the report noted that “[m]ost of these 
studies are limited in scale and have been conducted by firearms exam-
iners (and examiners in training) in state and local law enforcement 
laboratories as adjuncts to their regular casework.”268 The report found 
that the “validity of the fundamental assumptions of uniqueness and 
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been fully 
demonstrated.”269 The report went on to caution: 
Conclusions drawn in firearms identification should not be made 
to imply the presence of a firm statistical basis when none has 
been demonstrated. Specifically . . . examiners tend to cast their 
assessments in bold absolutes, commonly asserting that a match 
can be made “to the exclusion of all other firearms in the world.” 
Such comments cloak an inherently subjective assessment of a 
match with an extreme probability statement that has no firm 
grounding and unrealistically implies an error rate of zero.270 
Citing this report, the district court in United States v. Glynn271 
ruled that the expert would only be permitted to testify that it was 
“more likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came 
from a particular weapon.272 The court also commented: “Based on the 
Daubert hearings . . . the Court very quickly concluded that whatever 
else ballistics identification analysis could be called, it could not fairly 
 
266. Nat’l Research Council of The Nat’l Acads., Ballistic Imaging 
(Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008). 
267. The committee was asked to assess the feasibility, accuracy, reliability, and 
technical capability of developing and using a national ballistic database as 
an aid to criminal investigations. It concluded: (1) “A national reference 
ballistic image database of all new and imported guns is not advisable at this 
time;” and (2) the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network 
(NIBIN) “can and should be made more effective through operational and 
technological improvements.” Id. at 5, 239. 
268. Id. at 70. 
269. Id. at 81. The report also stated: “Additional general research on the 
uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks would have to 
be done if the basic premises of firearms identification are to be put on a 
more solid scientific footing.” Id. at 82. 
270. Id. at 82. 
271. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
272. Id. at 575. 
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be called ‘science.’”273 The court further noted that “[t]he problem is 
compounded by the tendency of ballistics experts . . . to make assertions 
that their matches are certain beyond all doubt, that the error rate of 
their methodology is ‘zero,’ and other such pretensions.”274 
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009) 
As noted previously, NAS issued its forensic report the following 
year in 2009. That Report summarized the state of the research as 
follows: 
Because not enough is known about the variabilities among 
individual tools and guns, we are not able to specify how many 
points of similarity are necessary for a given level of confidence in 
the result. Sufficient studies have not been done to understand 
the reliability and repeatability of the methods . . . . Individual 
patterns from manufacture or from wear might, in some cases, be 
distinctive enough to suggest one particular source, but additional 
studies should be performed to make the process of 
individualization more precise and repeatable.275 
In a different passage, the report—citing firearm and toolmark 
identifications—observed that “[m]uch forensic evidence . . . is 
introduced in criminal trials without any meaningful scientific valid-
ation, determination of error rates, or reliability testing to explain the 
limits of the discipline.”276 
AFTE rejected these findings out of hand, arguing that NAS 
“ignore[d] extensive research supporting the scientific underpinnings of 
the identification of firearm and toolmark evidence . . . .”277 The court 
in United States v. Otero278 accepted the AFTE’s position, citing studies 
which it was ill-equipped to evaluate.279 A subsequent review of the oft-
cited studies by two scientists concluded: 
 
273. Id. at 570. 
274. Id. at 574. 
275. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 154. 
276. Id. at 107–08. 
277. AFTE Comm. for the Advancement of the Sci. of Firearm and Tool Mark 
Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark 
Examiners to the February 2009 National Academy of Science Report 
“Strengthening the Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward”, 
41 AFTE J. 204, 206 (2009). 
278. 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437–38 (D.N.J. 2012) (“The Court’s analysis of the 
proposed testimony according to the Daubert factors leads it to conclude 
that [the] expert report and opinion are admissible under Rule 702.”). 
279. Id. at 438; see also NAS Forensic Report supra note 26, at 153–55. 
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Exaggerated and unfounded implications relating to rates of error 
inferred from even the best of existing experiments in the field of 
firearms/toolmarks, generally self-described as ‘validation 
studies’, typically result from statistical, metallurgical and/or 
psychological (cognitive) deficiencies in the design and conduct of 
the experiments, and frequently lead to unjustified inferential 
extrapolation to universal assumption for the practice domain.280 
Other courts took an important, but still limited, step of restricting 
examiner testimony by precluding the expert from making gross over-
statements such as declaring a match to the exclusion, either practical 
or absolute, of all other weapons.281 Similarly, some courts forbade 
experts from testifying that they hold their opinions to a “reasonable 
degree of scientific certitude.”282 That term has long been required by 
courts in many jurisdictions for the admission of expert testimony. 
Incredibly, the phrase has no scientific meaning and the claim of cer-
tainty is unsupported by empirical research. Thus, it is grossly mis-
leading. Indeed, the National Commission on Forensic Science rejected 
it.283 Still other courts went off on a quixotic tangent, substituting the 
phrase “reasonable degree of ballistic” certitude.284 Changing “scientific 
 
280. Clifford Spiegelman & William A. Tobin, Analysis of Experiments in 
Forensic Firearms/Toolmarks Practice Offered as Support for Low Rates of 
Practice Error and Claims of Inferential Certainty, 12 Law, Prob. & Risk 
115, 115 (2013). 
281. See, e.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d 239, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Nor can [the expert] testify that a match he identified is to ‘the exclusion 
of all other firearms in the world,’ or that there is a ‘practical impossibility’ 
that any other gun could have fired the recovered materials.”); United States 
v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009) (“[The expert] also will 
not be allowed to testify that he can conclude that there is a match to the 
exclusion, either practical or absolute, of all other guns.”). 
282. See, e.g., Ashburn, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 249 (“[T]he court joins in precluding 
this expert witness from testifying that he is ‘certain’ or ‘100%’ sure of his 
conclusions that certain items match.”); United States v. Willock, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2010) (“[The expert] shall state his opinions and 
conclusions without any characterization as to the degree of certainty with 
which he holds them.”); People v. Robinson, 2 N.E.3d 383, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2013) (“[T]he judicial decisions uniformly conclude toolmark and firearms 
identification is generally accepted and admissible at trial. Accordingly, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in ruling the testimony in this case was 
admissible . . . particularly where the trial judge barred the witnesses from 
testifying their opinions were ‘within a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty.’”). 
283. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views Document on Use of 
the Term “Reasonable Scientific Certainty” 1 (2016). 
284. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (“He may only testify that, in his opinion, 
the bullet came from the suspect rifle to within a reasonable degree of 
certainty in the firearms examination field.”); United States v. Cerna, No. 
CR 08–0730 WHA, 2010 WL 3448528, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (allowing 
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certainty” to “ballistic certainty” merely underscores the courts’ scien-
tific incompetence. 
However, even these modest limitations were rejected by other 
courts.285 For example, in United States v. Casey,286 the district court 
declined “to follow sister courts who have limited expert testimony 
based upon the 2008 and 2009 NAS reports and, instead, remains faith-
ful to the long-standing tradition of allowing the unfettered testimony 
of qualified ballistics experts.”287 
4. White House PCAST Report (2016) 
The 2016 White House PCAST report agreed with the 2009 NAS 
Report’s characterization of the scientific research on firearms and tool-
marks identification: “We find that many of these earlier studies were 
inappropriately designed to assess foundational validity and estimate 
reliability. Indeed, there is internal evidence among the studies them-
selves indicating that many previous studies underestimated the false 
positive rate by at least 100-fold.”288 In addition, PCAST found only 
one of the post-2009 studies sufficiently rigorous. The Defense Depart-
ment’s Forensic Science Center commissioned the study, which was 
conducted by an independent testing lab—the Ames Laboratory, a 
Department of Energy national laboratory affiliated with Iowa State 
University. In this study, “[t]he false-positive rate was estimated at 1 
 
experts “to testify that a particular bullet or cartridge case was fired from a 
particular firearm ‘to a reasonable degree of certainty in the ballistics field’” 
(quoting United States v. Diaz, No. 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *14 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927, 945 (Mass. 
2011) (stating that “the expert may offer that opinion to a ‘reasonable degree 
of ballistic certainty’”). 
285. See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 1 A.3d 572, 590 (Md. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“[N]otwithstanding the current debate on the issue, courts have consistently 
found the traditional method [of firearms identification] to be generally 
accepted within the scientific community, and to be reliable.”); People v. 
Givens, 912 N.Y.S.2d 855, 857 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (“This Court was unable to 
find any cases where firearms and toolmark identification was found to be 
unreliable or no longer scientifically acceptable.”). 
286. 928 F. Supp. 2d 397 (D.P.R. 2013). 
287. Id. at 400; see also United States v. Sebbern, No. 10 Cr. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 
5989813, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012); State v. Langlois, 2 N.E.3d 936, 
950 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (“Our conclusion on this issue finds support in the 
decisions of other appellate districts in Ohio, notwithstanding the recent 
criticisms in scientific reports and the limitations some federal courts have 
imposed on the testimony of firearms experts. These decisions hold that the 
methodology of comparatively analyzing and testing bullets and shell cases 
recovered from crime scenes is reliable.”); State v. Jones, 303 P.3d 1084, at 
¶ 75 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (expert testimony comparing bunter marks on 
the base of shell casings found at the crime scene to shell casings found in 
Jones’s home admissible under the Frye standard). 
288. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 11. 
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in 66, with a confidence bound indicating that the rate could be as high 
as 1 in 46.”289 The study had not been published in a scientific journal. 
According to the PCAST Report, more than one study is required and 
studies should be published in peer-reviewed scientific literature. 
Consequently, “the current evidence still falls short of the scientific cri-
teria for foundational validity.”290 
AFTE quickly retorted, expressing their “disappointment in the 
PCAST’s choice to ignore the research that has been conducted” and 
claiming that “[d]ecades of validation and proficiency studies have 
demonstrated that firearm and toolmark identification is scientifically 
valid . . . .”291 However, when PCAST later invited stakeholders to 
submit validation studies that it may have overlooked, no studies 
satisfying PCAST’s criteria were offered.292 
The lessons here are familiar. For years, an entrenched forensic dis-
cipline vigorously guarded its turf by rejecting the conclusions of the 
outside scientific community.293 It published a journal which was “peer-
reviewed” by other members of its discipline. The journal, which is ad-
vertised as “the Scientific Journal” of AFTE, was not generally avail-
able until 2016. The discipline claimed to be a “science” but did not 
hold itself to the normative standards of science. The AFTE “Theory 
of Identification” is “clearly not a scientific theory, which the National 
Academy of Sciences has defined as ‘a comprehensive explanation of 
some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evi-
dence.’ . . . More importantly, the stated method is circular.”294 Only 
recently, after two NAS reports, have some courts begun to limit mis-
leading testimony. Many have not. Thus, the courts’ competence to 
deal with flawed research remains extant.295 
 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners Response to PCAST 
Report on Forensic Science, 48 AFTE J. 195, 195 (2016). 
292. President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., An Addendum 
to the PCAST Report on Forensic Science in Criminal Courts 7 
(2017) (“Several respondents wrote to PCAST concerning firearms analysis. 
None cited additional appropriately designed black-box studies similar to the 
recent Ames Laboratory study.”). 
293. See William A. Tobin et al., Absence of Statistical and Scientific Ethos: The 
Common Denominator in Deficient Forensic Practices, 4 Stat. & Pub. 
Pol’y 1, 9 (2016) (“[P]ractitioners remain intractable even after years of 
critical scholarly papers, ad hoc committees of the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS), position statements from the U.S. Department of 
Justice . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
294. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 60. 
295. Tobin et al., supra note 293, at 9 (“[T]he purported ‘validation studies’ 
typically proffered to courts are seriously flawed [and] have no external 
validity . . . .”). 
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In 2005, the district court in Green cautioned: “The more courts 
admit this type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation, 
proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy practices 
will endure; we should require more.”296 Over a decade later, a 
concurring opinion in Williams v. United States297 concluded: “As mat-
ters currently stand, a certainty statement regarding toolmark pattern 
matching has the same probative value as the vision of a psychic: it re-
flects nothing more than the individual’s foundationless faith in what 
he believes to be true.”298 In short, there is a “lost decade” during which 
the discipline summarily dismissed criticisms when it should have lead 
the effort for more rigorous research. 
B. Fingerprint Examinations 
Before DNA analysis, fingerprint identification was the “gold 
standard” in forensics.299 Like many other forensic disciplines, it gained 
judicial acceptance decades before Daubert was decided. People v. 
Jennings,300 the first reported fingerprint case, was decided in 1911. In 
1984, the FBI pronounced the technique “infallible” in its official 
publication, which also referred to the technique as a “science.”301 
Nevertheless, it is a subjective technique without an objective standard 
and typically involves partial prints with inevitable distortions. 
1. Post-Daubert Cases 
After Daubert, challenges to fingerprint comparison testimony were 
decidedly unsuccessful.302 One infamous case, United States v. 
 
296. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 (D. Mass. 2005). 
297. 130 A.3d 343 (D.C. 2016). 
298. Id. at 355 (Easterly, J., concurring). 
299. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic 
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 Stetson L. Rev. 621, 654 (2007) 
(“The scientific integrity and reliability of DNA testing have helped DNA 
replace fingerprinting and made DNA evidence the new ‘gold standard’ of 
forensic evidence.”). 
300. 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). See generally 1 Giannelli et al., supra note 20, 
§16 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint 
identification). 
301. Federal Bureau of Investigation, The Science of Fingerprints: 
Classification and Uses iv (1984). 
302. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(“Fingerprint evidence and analysis is generally accepted.”); United States 
v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984, 991 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Martinez-
Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.P.R. 2001) (discussing how flaws and 
difficulties surrounding fingerprint evidence do not exclude the evidence 
outright). 
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Havvard,303 illustrates the judiciary’s lack of rigor in applying Daubert. 
Not only did the district court uphold the fingerprint testimony’s 
admissibility, it styled the technique as “the very archetype of reliable 
expert testimony under [the Daubert/Kumho] standards.”304 According 
to the court, latent print identification had been “tested” for nearly one 
hundred years in adversarial proceedings with the highest possible 
stakes—liberty and sometimes life. Yet, Daubert required scientific, not 
“adversarial,” testing.305 Next, in citing “peer review,” the court noted 
that a second fingerprint examiner also compared the prints: “In fact, 
peer review is the standard operating procedure among latent print ex-
aminers.”306 This statement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of 
“peer review” as used in Daubert. In that case, peer review meant 
refereed scientific journals in which validation research is published. An 
amici brief submitted in Daubert by the New England Journal of 
Medicine and other scientific publications explained that peer review’s 
“role is to promote the publication of well-conceived articles so that the 
most important review, the consideration of the reported results by the 
scientific community, may occur after publication.”307 
Moreover, the court accepted the prosecution expert’s astounding 
claim that the “error rate for the method is zero.”308 Experts argued 
that, while individual examiners may make mistakes, the method itself 
is perfect. The dichotomy between “methodological” and “human” error 
rates in this context, however, is “practically meaningless”309 because 
 
303. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). 
304. Id. at 855; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 
42 Crim. L. Bull. 624, 628 (2006). 
305. See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & Pol’y 143, 170 (2005) 
(“The argument that no latent print has ever been found to match the rolled 
print of a different person is . . . misleading because no systematic search for 
such pairs on the entire databank of millions of fingerprints has ever been 
performed.”). 
306. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
307. Brief of the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American 
Medical Association, and Annals of Internal Medicine as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006287, at *3. 
308. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
309. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 
Brook. L. Rev. 13, 60 (2001). Professor Mnookin goes on to provide this 
analogy: “The same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a 
notoriously unreliable form of evidence. People are all distinct from one 
another in observable ways; therefore the theoretical error rate of eyewitness 
identification is zero, though in practice observers may frequently make 
errors.” Id.; see also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error 
in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 
1040 (2005) (stating that while a “distinction can be drawn between 
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the examiner is the method.310 Finally, the court turned Daubert on its 
head by requiring the defendant to prove the evidence was unreliable, 
a distortion that would be employed in later cases.311 
Then, United States v. Llera Plaza312 “sent shock waves through the 
community of fingerprint analysts.”313 In that 2002 case, Judge Pollak 
ruled that fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify that 
two sets of prints “matched”—that is, a positive identification to the 
exclusion of all other persons. This was apparently the first time in over 
ninety years that such a decision had been rendered.314 On rehearing, 
however, Judge Pollak reversed himself,315 and later cases continued to 
uphold the admissibility of fingerprint evidence.316 Nevertheless, the 
case captured the attention of the media with news reports,317 main-
 
‘methodological’ and ‘practitioner’ error” in other areas, “in fingerprint 
practice the concept is vacuous”). 
310. See Zabell, supra note 305, at 172 (“But, given its unavoidable subjective 
component, in latent print examination people are the process.”). 
311. See Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science 
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1167, 
1173–76 (2003) (discussing the reversal of the burden of persuasion as one of 
several judicial responses employed to avoid confronting the lack of empirical 
testing); see also Giannelli, supra note 304, at 630. 
312. 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 
2002). 
313. D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 
21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1073, 1073 (2003). 
314. As Professor Mnookin has noted, however, “fingerprints were accepted as an 
evidentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or skepticism.” Mnookin, 
supra note 309, at 17. She elaborated: “Even if no two people had identical 
sets of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two people could have a 
single identical print, much less an identical part of a print. These are 
necessarily matters of probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor 
subsequent judges ever required that fingerprinting identification be placed 
on a secure statistical foundation.” Id. at 19. 
315. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
316. See, e.g., United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We 
agree with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint 
evidence admitted in this case satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis, 
387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding fingerprint evidence reliable); 
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that 
when assessed using the Daubert factors, the fingerprinting evidence 
“pass[ed] muster”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 
fingerprint analysis as evidence); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 
700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (finding that the possibility that two fingers may 
have a portion of their print in common speaks to weight and not the 
admissibility of fingerprint evidence). 
317. E.g., Joann Loviglio, Trial Judge Reaffirms Fingerprint Usability; Hearing 
Shows Him Science Involved, San Antonio Express-News, Mar. 14, 2002; 
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stream publications,318 scientific journals,319 and television shows giving 
it substantial coverage.320 A spate of legal articles followed,321 with some 
commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was more faithful to Daubert 
than Llera Plaza II.322 In response, the FBI adopted a “circle the 
wagons” attitude, fiercely defending the technique. The head of the FBI 
fingerprint section told 60 Minutes that the error rate was “zero,” ex-
aminers only testify to “hundred percent certainty,” and the FBI had 
won “forty-one out of forty-one” legal challenges to fingerprint evi-
dence.323 
The appellate opinion most faithful to Daubert appeared in United 
States v. Crisp324—unfortunately in dissent. The majority opinion 
upheld the admissibility of fingerprint evidence by shifting the burden 
of proof to the defendant and by grandfathering the technique.325 In 
dissent, Judge Michael conscientiously applied the Daubert factors. 
First, he noted that the “government did not offer any record of testing 
 
Andy Newman, Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints Changes his 
Mind, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2002; Richard Willing, Judge Challenges 
Fingerprint Identification, USA Today, Jan. 10, 2002. 
318. See, e.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of 
Forensic Evidence Is Now Being Challenged, New Yorker (May 27, 2002), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/05/27/do-fingerprints-lie [https: 
//perma.cc/T873-TJA7]. 
319. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 Science 
339, 339–340 (2002). 
320. 60 Minutes: Fingerprints: Infallible Evidence? (CBS television broadcast 
Jan. 5, 2003). 
321. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility 
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 1189, 1189 (2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The 
Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 607 
(2002); Kristin Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem 
with the Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45 
Jurimetrics 41, 53–56 (2004). 
322. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, Issues in Sci. 
& Tech., Fall 2003, at 47 (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting latent 
fingerprint individualization testimony] was the better one.”); Recent Case, 
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 Harv. L. Rev. 
2349, 2352 (2002) (“Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive 
application of the Daubert factors . . . .”). 
323. 60 Minutes, supra note 320. 
324. 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003). 
325. Id. at 269 (“Put simply, Crisp has provided us no reason today to believe 
that this general acceptance of the principles underlying fingerprint 
identification has, for decades, been misplaced. Accordingly, the district 
court was well within its discretion in accepting at face value the consensus 
of the expert and judicial communities that the fingerprint identification 
technique is reliable.”); see also Giannelli, supra note 304, at 632. 
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on the reliability of fingerprint identification. . . . [T]here have not been 
any studies to establish how likely it is that partial prints taken from a 
crime scene will be a match for only one set of fingerprints in the 
world.”326 Second, as for peer review: 
[a]gain, the government offered no evidence on this factor at trial. 
Fingerprint examiners . . . have their own professional 
publications. . . . But unlike typical scientific journals, the 
fingerprint publications do not run articles that include or prompt 
critique or reanalysis by other scientists. Indeed, few of the 
articles address the principles of fingerprint analysis and 
identification at all . . . .327 
Third, “an error rate must be demonstrated by reliable scientific 
studies, not by assumption.”328 Fourth, “the government did not es-
tablish that there are objective standards in the fingerprint examination 
field to guide examiners in making their comparisons.”329 Fifth, while 
acknowledging general acceptance in the fingerprint community, the 
judge remarked that “[n]othing in the record in this case shows that the 
fingerprint examination community has challenged itself sufficiently or 
has been challenged in any real sense by outside scientists.”330 
2. Madrid Train Bombing 
Llera Plaza was soon eclipsed by a more sensational event—the 
FBI’s misidentification of Brandon Mayfield as the source of the crime 
scene prints in the terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 
2004.331 More than any other event, the Mayfield affair exposed the 
myth of fingerprint infallibility. This debacle resulted in investigations 
 
326. Id. at 273–74 (Michael, J., dissenting). 
327. Id. at 274 (citing Epstein, supra note 321, at 644. 
328. Id. The judge added: “In a 1995 test conducted by a commercial testing 
service, less than half of the fingerprint examiners were able to identify 
correctly all of the matches and eliminate the non-matches. On a similar test 
in 1998, less than sixty percent of the examiners were able to make all 
identifications and eliminations. . . . An error rate that runs remarkably close 
to chance can hardly be viewed as acceptable under Daubert.” Id. at 275 
(citing Epstein, supra note 321, at 634–35). 
329. Id. at 276. 
330. Id. 
331. See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, 
N.Y. Times, June 5, 2004, at A1 (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon 
Mayfield and matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national); Flynn 
McRoberts & Maurice Possley, Report Blasts FBI Lab: Peer Pressure Led 
to False ID of Madrid Fingerprint, Chi. Trib., Nov. 14, 2004, at 1. 
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by the FBI332 and the Inspector General of the DOJ (“IG”).333 One of 
the more troubling aspects of these reports dealt with the culture in the 
laboratory. The FBI internal investigation found that “[t]o disagree was 
not an expected response,”334 and the IG reported that “FBI examiners 
did not attempt to determine the basis of the [Spanish National Police’s] 
doubts before reiterating that they were ‘absolutely confident’ in the 
identification on April 15, a full week before the FBI Laboratory met 
with the SNP.”335 
In addition to highlighting the lack of foundational research, these 
events raised a host of other issues, including: (1) the role of cognitive 
bias in subjective techniques,336 (2) the lack of well-defined standards,337 
(3) the failure to administer rigorous proficiency tests,338 (4) the 
 
332. See Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint 
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. Forensic 
Identification 707 (2004). 
333. See Office of the Inspector Gen., DOJ, A Review of the FBI’s 
Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case: Unclassified Executive 
Summary 7 (2006) (“Having found as many as 10 points of unusual 
similarity, the FBI examiners began to ‘find’ additional features in [the 
print] that were not really there, but rather were suggested to the examiners 
by features in the Mayfield prints.”). 
334. Stacey, supra note 332, at 713. 
335. Office of the Inspector Gen., supra note 333, at 10. 
336. See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable 
to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 Forensic Sci. Int’l 74, 75–76 
(2006) (reporting an experiment that showed fingerprint examiners changed 
their opinions when provided with irrelevant information); Elizabeth F. 
Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter to the Editor, Contaminated Evidence, 
Science, May 2004, at 959, 959(“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly 
unwilling to confront and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can 
be overcome through sheer force of will and good intentions.”); Stacey, 
supra note 332, at 713 (“confirmation bias”). See generally D. Michael 
Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in 
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 39 (2002). 
337. Examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, 
and Verification (ACE-V). See Zabell, supra note 305, at 178 (“ACE-V is 
an acronym, not a methodology. It is merely the common sense description 
of what anyone would do if they were examining a latent and a candidate 
source print.”). 
338. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., 
dissenting) (“Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that 
are far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.”); United 
States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that 
“the FBI examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took 
did not. . . . [O]n the present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are 
less demanding than they should be.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Editorial, A 
Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, Boston Globe, Feb. 2, 
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manipulation of research,339 and (5) other instances of misidenti-
fications.340 The FBI did not undertake a serious review of fingerprints 
until it was compelled to address the issue due to the negative publicity 
surrounding the Mayfield misidentification. Even then, however, the 
FBI still characterized the technique as “scientific.”341 
The scientific community continued to note the lack of research,342 
and the courts continued to ignore this fact.343 Indeed, in United States 
 
2004 (“There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill. 
Those tests that exist are not routinely used and are substandard.”). 
339. See Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, Science, 
Dec. 5 2003, at 1625, 1625 (discussing the cancellation of a National 
Academies project designed to examine various forensic science techniques, 
including fingerprinting, because the DOJ and Defense insisted on a right of 
review that the Academy had refused to other grant sponsors); United States 
v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 255 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are deeply discomforted 
by Mitchell’s contention—supported by Dr. Rau’s account of events, though 
contradicted by other witnesses—that a conspiracy within the DOJ 
intentionally delayed the release of the solicitation until after Mitchell’s jury 
reached a verdict. Dr. Rau’s story, if true, would be a damning indictment 
of the ethics of those involved.”). See generally Giannelli, supra note 201 
(discussing the manipulation of forensic science research, including 
fingerprint research, by law enforcement). 
340. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent 
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 985, 999 (2005) 
(discussing twenty-two cases involving misattribution of latent fingerprints). 
The misidentification cases include some that involved (1) verification by 
one or more other examiners, (2) examiners certified by the International 
Association of Identification, (3) procedures using a sixteen-point standard, 
and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made by 
prosecution experts. Id. at 1023–25; see also CNN Presents: Reasonable 
Doubt (CNN television broadcast Jan. 9, 2005) (discussing the 
misidentification of Riky Jackson, who spent two years in prison). 
341. See Bruce Budowle et al., Review of the Scientific Basis for Friction Ridge 
Comparisons as a Means of Identification: Committee Findings and 
Recommendations, Forensic Sci. Comm., Jan. 2006, at 1, https://www2. 
fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2006/research/2006_01_research02.htm 
[https://perma.cc/86NF-XSBQ]. 
342. See Donald Kennedy & Richard A. Merrill, Assessing Forensic Science, 
Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 2003, at 33, 34 (“The increased use of DNA 
analysis, which has undergone extensive validation, has thrown into relief 
the less firmly credentialed status of other forensic science identification 
techniques (fingerprints, fiber analysis, hair analysis, ballistics, bite marks, 
and tool marks). These have not undergone the type of extensive testing and 
verification that is the hallmark of science elsewhere.”); Zabell, supra note 
305, at 164 (“Although there is a substantial literature on the uniqueness of 
fingerprints, it is surprising how little true scientific support for the 
proposition exists.”). 
343. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The 
district court did not abuse its discretion. Numerous courts have found 
expert testimony on fingerprint identification based on the ACE-V method 
to be sufficiently reliable under Daubert.”); United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 
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v. Baines,344 decided in 2009, the head of the FBI fingerprint section 
testified: “As to these ‘false positives’ . . . the FBI had ‘made, on 
average, about one erroneous identification every 11 years.’ The total 
number of identifications made has been about one million per 
year . . . so that the known actual error rate was about one per eleven 
million identifications.”345 Problematically, he merely assumed that all 
the other identifications were correct, thus disqualifying his analysis. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this testimony was the lack of 
self-awareness for a person who claimed to be a scientist.346 
3. NAS Forensic Science Report (2009) 
Fingerprint examiners follow a procedure known as Analysis, Com-
parison, Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V). The 2009 NAS report 
observed that since “the ACE-V method does not specify particular 
measurements or a standard test protocol . . . examiners must make 
subjective assessments throughout.”347 Thus, the ACE-V method is too 
“broadly stated” to “qualify as a validated method for this type of 
analysis.”348 The Report added that “[t]he latent print community in 
the United States has eschewed numerical scores and corresponding 
thresholds” and consequently relies “on primarily subjective criteria” in 
making the ultimate attribution decision.349 In making the decision, the 
examiner must draw on his or her personal experience to evaluate such 
factors as “inevitable variations in pressure,” but to date those factors 
have not been “characterized, quantified, or compared.”350 In addition, 
the Report gave short shrift to the zero-error-rate argument, finding 
that “claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scien-
 
1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he fingerprint evidence admitted in this case 
satisfied Daubert.”); United States v. Janis, 387 F.3d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“We conclude the district court did not err in admitting the fingerprint 
expert’s testimony.”); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“We therefore accept that the error rate has been sufficiently 
identified to count this factor as strongly favoring admission of the 
[fingerprint] evidence.”). 
344. 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009). 
345. Id. at 984. 
346. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 53 (“The fallacy is 
obvious: the expert simply assumed without evidence that every error in 
casework had come to light.”). 
347. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 139. 
348. Id. at 142. 
349. Id. at 141. 
350. Id. at 144. Moreover, examiners lack population frequency data to quantify 
the rarity or commonality of a particular type of fingerprint characteristic. 
Id. 
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tifically plausible.”351 In conclusion, the Report outlined an agenda for 
the research it considered necessary “[t]o properly underpin the process 
of friction ridge identification . . . .”352 
Several studies were published after the NAS Report.353 The most 
important was a FBI study published in 2011,354 which is discussed 
below. 
4. White House PCAST Report (2016) 
According to the White House PCAST report, “latent fingerprint 
analysis is a foundationally valid subjective methodology” and the FBI 
“has lead the way” by conducting the black-box study.355 Nevertheless, 
[the] false positive rate . . . is substantial and is likely to be higher 
than expected by many jurors based on longstanding claims about 
the infallibility of fingerprint analysis. The false-positive rate 
could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases based on the FBI study 
and 1 error in 18 cases based on a study by another crime 
laboratory. In reporting results of [a] latent-fingerprint 
examination, it is important to state the false-positive rates based 
on properly designed validation studies . . . .356 
Moreover, “testimony asserting any specific level of increased ac-
curacy (beyond that measured in the studies) due to blind independent 
verification would be scientifically inappropriate, as speculation 
unsupported by empirical evidence.”357 
 
351. Id. at 142; see also id. at 143 (“Some in the latent print community argue 
that the method itself, if followed correctly . . . has a zero error rate. Clearly, 
this assertion is unrealistic . . . . The method, and the performance of those 
who use it, are inextricably linked, and both involve multiple sources of error 
(e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in human 
judgment).”). 
352. Id. at 144. 
353. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 91–95. 
354. Bradford T. Ulery et al., Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent 
Fingerprint Decisions, 108 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. 7733 (2011). The 
White House PCAST Report described the methodology of the report: “To 
attempt to ensure that the non-mated pairs were representative of the type 
of matches that might arise when police identify a suspect by searching 
fingerprint databases, the known prints were selected by searching the latent 
prints against the 58 million fingerprints in the [Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System] database and selecting one of the closest matching 
hits.” White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 94. 
355. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 9. 
356. Id. at 9–10. 
357. Id. at 96. 
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5. AAAS Fingerprint Report (2017) 
In September 2017, the AAAS published an extensive report on 
fingerprint analysis.358 An accompanying news release, summarized the 
report’s findings: “Courtroom testimony and reports stating or even 
those implying that fingerprints collected from a crime scene belong to 
a single person are indefensible and lack scientific foundation . . . .”359 
The report reached a number of conclusions. First, claims that ex-
perts can identify the source of a latent print with 100 percent accuracy, 
are “clearly overstated and are now widely recognized as indefens-
ible.”360 Second, use of the term “identification” in reports and testi-
mony even with qualifications “fail to deal forthrightly with the level 
of uncertainty that exists in latent print examination” and “cannot be 
justified scientifically.”361 Third, because of public misconceptions, 
experts: 
should acknowledge: (1) that the conclusions being reported are 
opinions rather than facts (as in all pattern-matching disciplines), 
(2) that it is not possible for a latent print examiner to determine 
that two friction ridge impressions originated from the same 
source to the exclusion of all others; and (3) that errors have 
occurred in studies of the accuracy of latent print examination.362 
The report went on to make several recommendations. Experts 
should “avoid statements that claim or imply that the pool of possible 
sources is limited to a single person. Terms like ‘match,’ ‘identification,’ 
‘individualization’ and their synonyms, imply more that the science can 
sustain.”363 In addition, experts should “be prepared to discuss forth-
 
358. See AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39. 
359. Anne Q. Hoy, Fingerprint Source Identity Lacks Scientific Basis for Legal 
Certainty: More Research into Validity of Fingerprint Comparisons Needed, 
Forensic Report Says, AAAS (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.aaas.org/ 
news/fingerprint-source-identity-lacks-scientific-basis-legal-certainty [https: 
//perma.cc/Z8SP-42KL]. 
360. AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39, at 9. 
361. Id. at 10. 
362. Id. at 11. 
363. Id. The report suggested that: 
[E]xaminers might say something like the following: “The latent 
print on Exhibit ## and the record fingerprint bearing the name 
XXXX have a great deal of corresponding ridge detail with no 
differences that would indicate they were made by different fingers. 
There is no way to determine how many other people might have a 
finger with a corresponding set of ridge features, but this degree of 
similarity is far greater than I have ever seen in non-matched 
comparisons.” 
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rightly the results of research studies that tested the accuracy of latent 
print examiners on realistic known-source samples.”364 
Despite the ruckus created by Llera Plaza and the Mayfield fiasco, 
examiner testimony remained unchanged. Testimony such as “zero er-
ror rates,” “matches to the exclusion of all other fingerprints,” and “100 
percent certainty”—which had been used for decades—continued, while 
the fingerprint community remained oblivious that such statements 
were scientifically implausible. As with firearms identification, there is 
a “lost decade” during which more research could have been conducted. 
As one judge noted in a 2003 dissent: “The government has had ten 
years to comply with Daubert. It should not be given a pass in this 
case.”365 Those words were written fifteen years ago. 
On a positive note, the Mayfield incident did trigger the FBI’s black 
box study, which was a significant achievement. Still, this study was 
released 100 years after the courts first admitted fingerprint evidence.366 
The White House PCAST report found it “distressing” that properly 
constructed validation studies had only been conducted recently and 
only one study had been published in a peer-reviewed journal.367 
Daubert has had little effect.368 
III. Forensic Science Research 
By now it is almost a truism that too many forensic disciplines are 
not grounded in science—and yet their adherents continue to claim the 
mantle of science. The 2009 NAS Report emphasized the “notable 
dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific 
bases and validity of many forensic methods.”369 Indeed, the co-chair of 
the NAS committee, Judge Harry Edwards, later stated: “I think that 
the most important part of our committee’s report is its call for real 
 
 Id. at 11. 
364. Id. 
365. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., 
dissenting). 
366. See supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
367. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 95. 
368. Some courts did, however, place limitations on the testimony. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Testimony at 
the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint examiners insist 
that there is no error rate associated with their activities or that the 
examination process is irreducibly subjective. This would be out-of-place 
under Rule 702.”); Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 61 n.22 
(Mass. 2010) (“[O]pinions expressing absolute certainty about, or the 
infallibility of, an ‘individualization’ of a print should be avoided.”). 
369. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 8. 
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science to support the forensic disciplines.”370 Not surprisingly, the re-
port triggered extensive commentary.371 One article cataloged the num-
erous ways in which forensic science has failed to develop a research 
culture372 and argued that the “core values” of a scientific culture “are 
empiricism, transparency, and an ongoing critical perspective.”373 
Another article documented the serious problems that have arisen when 
law enforcement controls forensic research.374 
A. National Commission on Forensic Science (2013-17) 
To its credit, the DOJ, in partnership with the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), established the National 
Commission on Forensic Science in 2013. The commission’s task was to 
enhance the practice and improve the reliability of forensic science.375 
Early on, the commission created a subcommittee on scientific inquiry 
and research, which undertook the task of reviewing bibliographies of 
foundational literature that had been compiled by various forensic 
disciplines.376 The subcommittee quickly concluded that even a “cursory 
review” of the bibliographies raised serious concerns. One basic problem 
involved the definition of foundational literature. According to the sub-
committee, “[i]n some cases, it was unclear which literature citations 
are crucial to support the foundation of a particular forensic science 
 
370. Honorable Harry T. Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on 
Forensic Sciences: What it Means for the Bench and Bar, Address at 
Conference of Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C. 
(May 6, 2010), in 51 Jurimetrics 1, 9 (2010). 
371. See Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic Science Report: A Literature 
Review, 48 Crim. L. Bull. 378 (2012) (listing numerous articles and 
conferences commenting on the report). 
372. Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic 
Sciences, 58 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 725 (2011). 
373. Id. at 742. 
374. See Giannelli, supra note 201. 
375. National Commission on Forensic Science, DOJ, https://www.justice. 
gov/ncfs [https://perma.cc/AGU4-VDR8] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017). 
376. As a result of the 2009 NAS report, an Interagency Working Group—the 
Research Development Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) of the 
National Science and Technology Council’s Subcommittee on Forensic 
Science—was tasked with identifying foundational research in the forensic 
sciences. The RDT&E committee requested Scientific Working Groups 
(SWGs) to address a series of discipline-specific questions. In response, 
literature compendiums were submitted to the RDT&E committee by 
several forensic working groups. Nat’l Sci. & Tech. Council, Comm. on 
Sci., Subcomm. on Forensic Sci., Strengthening the Forensic 
Sciences (2014). 
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discipline.”377 This finding led the subcommittee to define the term. 
Foundational, scientific literature should consist of “original research, 
substantive reviews of the original research, clinical trial reports, or 
reports of consensus development conferences.”378 Tellingly, the 
subcommittee felt compelled to add: “While other forms of dissemi-
nation of research and practice (e.g., oral and poster presentations at 
meetings, workshops, personal communications, editorials, disserta-
tions, theses, and letters to editors) play an important role in science, 
the open, peer-reviewed literature is what endures and forms a foun-
dation for further advancements.”379 
The subcommittee’s second concern was that “[s]ome of the cited 
literature had not undergone a rigorous peer-review process.”380 Peer re-
view by other members of a forensic discipline is not sufficient.381 Many 
of the reviewers are not scientists, and there is the problem with role 
bias. According to the subcommittee, foundational research should be 
subjected to “rigorous peer review with independent external reviewers 
to validate the accuracy . . . [and] overall consistency with scientific 
norms of practice”382 and “[p]ublished in a journal that is searchable 
using free, publicly available search engines . . . .”383 With few 
 
377. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Scientific Literature in 
Support of Forensic Science and Practice 2 (2015). 
378. Id. 
379. Id. 
380. Id. 
381. See United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J., 
dissenting) (“Fingerprint examiners . . . have their own professional 
publications. . . . But unlike typical scientific journals, the fingerprint 
publications do not run articles that include or prompt critique or reanalysis 
by other scientists. Indeed, few of the articles address the principles of 
fingerprint analysis and identification at all . . . .”). See also Zabell, supra 
note 305, at 164 (“Although there is a substantial literature on the 
uniqueness of fingerprints, it is surprising how little true scientific support 
for the proposition exists.”). 
382. Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Sci., supra note 377, at 3 (“Published in a 
journal that maintains a clear and publicly available statement of purpose 
that encourages ethical conduct such as disclosure of potential conflicts of 
interest integral to the peer review process.”). 
383. Id. at 2. Other publication requirements include being: (1) “[p]ublished in a 
journal or book that has an International Standard Number (ISSN for 
journals; ISBN for books) and recognized expert(s) as authors (for books) or 
on its Editorial Board (for journals);” and (2) “[p]ublished in a journal that 
is indexed in databases that are available through academic libraries and 
other services (e.g. JSTOR, Web of Science, Academic Search Complete, and 
SciFinder Scholar).” Id. at 2–3. 
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exceptions, the disciplines considered above have not satisfied these 
requirements.384 
Another recommendation—one on technical merit—provides: “All 
forensic science methodologies should be evaluated by an independent 
scientific body to characterize their capabilities and limitations in order 
to accurately and reliably answer a specific and clearly defined forensic 
question.”385 Significantly, the commission recommended that NIST be 
the independent scientific evaluator within the justice system. 
 
384. Another commission document provided guidance for evaluating scientific 
literature. Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views of the 
Commission Regarding Identifying and Evaluating Literature 
that Supports the Basic Principles of a Forensic Science Method 
or Forensic Science Discipline (2016). This guidance includes: 
• Is the problem or hypothesis clearly stated? 
• Is the scope of the article clearly stated as appropriate 
(article, case study, review, technical note, etc.)? 
• Is the literature review current, thorough, and relevant 
to the problem being studied? 
• Does this work fill a clear gap in the literature or is it 
confirmatory and/or incremental? 
• Are the experimental procedures clear and complete such 
that the work could be easily reproduced? 
• Are the experimental methods appropriate to the 
problem? 
• Are the methods fully validated to the necessary level of 
rigor (fit for purpose)? 
• Are the data analysis and statistical methodology 
appropriate for the problem, and explained clearly so it 
can be reproduced? 
• Are the experimental results clearly and completely 
presented and discussed? 
• Are omissions and limitations to the study discussed and 
explained? 
• Are the results and conclusions reasonable and defensible 
based on the work and the supporting literature? 
• Are the citations and references complete and accurate? 
• Are the references original (primary) and not secondary? 
• Are funding sources and other potential sources of 
conflict of interest clearly stated? 
 Id. at 3. 
385. Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ, Views of the Commission: 
Technical Merit Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and 
Practices 2 (2016); see also Nat’l Comm’n. on Forensic Sci., DOJ, 
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B. White House PCAST Report (2016) 
Unlike the commission, which had a broad mandate, the White 
House PCAST Report focused only on the validation issue. It took pains 
to explain the concept of validation, noting that forensic methods must 
be based on empirical studies and be “repeatable, reproducible, and ac-
curate, at levels that have been measured and are appropriate to the 
intended application.”386 The report recognized that forensic methods 
may be either objective or subjective. Foundational validity for 
objective methods “can be established by studying [and] measuring the 
accuracy, reproducibility, and consistency of each of its individual 
steps.”387 By definition, this approach is not possible with subjective 
techniques because they involve significant human judgment. Con-
sequently, validity and reliability for these methods must be based on 
“black-box studies”—as if a “black box” is in the examiner’s head—in 
which numerous examiners make decisions on many independent tests 
in order to determine error rates.388 
Importantly, the report also specified what does not qualify as 
validation: “[N]either experience, nor judgment, nor good professional 
practices (such as certification programs and accreditation programs, 
standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics) can 
substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and reliability.”389 
Moreover, expressions of confidence by individual examiners or a con-
sensus among practitioners about accuracy cannot substitute for “error 
rates estimated from relevant studies.”390 In sum, empirical evidence is 
the “sine qua non” for establishing foundational validity.391 
PCAST also recommended that NIST conduct scientific evaluations 
of the validity of current and new forensic technologies: “[t]o ensure the 
scientific judgments are unbiased and independent, such evaluations 
 
Recommendation to the Attorney General Technical Merit 
Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and Practices 1 (2016). 
386. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 4. Here, “repeatable” 
means an examiner reaches the same result when analyzing the same sample. 
“Reproducible” means that different examiners reach the same result when 
analyzing the same sample. The term “accurate” means that “an examiner 
obtains correct results both (1) for samples from the same source (true 
positives) and (2) for samples from different sources (true negatives).” 
Finally, “reliability” means “repeatability, reproducibility, and accuracy.” 
Id. at 47. 
387. Id. at 5. 
388. Id. at 5–6. 
389. Id. at 6. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
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should be conducted by an agency which has no stake in the out-
come.”392 
In response, DOJ released a statement criticizing the report on the 
day of its release. According to DOJ, the PCAST Report “does not 
mention numerous published research studies which seem to meet 
PCAST’s criteria for appropriately designed studies providing support 
for foundational validity. That omission discredits the PCAST report 
as a thorough evaluation of scientific validity.”393 PCAST, in turn, 
invited all stakeholders to identify validity studies that it might have 
overlooked. “DOJ ultimately concluded that it had no additional 
studies for PCAST to consider.”394 Nor did the more than 400 papers 
submitted by twenty-six respondents cause PCAST to change its 
positions. The bottom line remained: “In science, empirical testing is 
the only way to establish the validity and degree of reliability of such 
an empirical method. Fortunately, empirical testing of empirical meth-
ods is feasible. There is no justification for accepting that a method is 
valid and reliable in the absence of appropriate empirical evidence.”395 
However, most prior studies use “closed-set design.”396 In these studies, 
“the correct source of each questioned sample is always present; studies 
using the closed-set design have underestimated the false-positive and 
inconclusive rates by more than 100-fold.”397 
IV. Independent Scientific Review 
As discussed above, the courts have too often failed to fulfill their 
“gatekeeper”398 function under Daubert. However, the Daubert Court 
 
392. Id. at 14. The NAS report considered NIST before recommending an 
independent agency but rejected the idea because, at that time, NIST had 
limited ties to forensic science. See NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 
17. 
393. FBI, Comments on PCAST Report to the President, Forensic 
Science in Federal Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity 
of Pattern Comparison Methods 1 (2016), http://www.crime-scene-
investigator.net/PDF/fbi-response-to-forensic-science-in-federal-criminal-
courts-ensuring-scientific-validity-of-pattern-comparison-methods.pdf [https:/ 
/perma.cc/DTF5-RJ5M]. 
394. President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. and Tech., An Addendum 
to the PCAST Report on Forensic science in Criminal Courts 3 
(2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensics_addendum_finalv2.pdf [https://perma.cc/68 
NX-6C6A]). 
395. Id. at 4. 
396. Id. at 7. 
397. Id. 
398. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (describing 
Daubert as prescribing “a gatekeeping role for the judge”). 
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also suggested that the adversary system would serve as a complemen-
tary safeguard, noting that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation 
of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are 
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admis-
sible evidence.”399 
Yet, these “traditional” means have also proved inadequate. After 
the release of the NAS Report, some commentators focused on defense 
counsel’s incompetence.400 A 2009 study of the cases of 137 convicts 
exonerated by DNA profiling revealed that “[d]efense counsel rarely 
made any objections to the invalid forensic science testimony in these 
trials and rarely effectively cross-examined forensic analysts who pro-
vided invalid science testimony.”401 One commentator summed it up 
this way: 
Unlike the extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal 
defendant’s challenge is usually perfunctory. Even when the most 
vulnerable forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and 
handwriting—are attacked, the courts routinely affirm 
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established 
at a hearing. Defense lawyers generally fail to build a challenge 
with appropriate witnesses and new data. Thus, even if inclined 
to mount a Daubert challenge, they lack the requisite knowledge 
and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed.402 
Although the defense bar bears some responsibility for Daubert’s 
failure, there are limits to what can be expected of overburdened and 
chronically underfunded public defenders when dealing with expert  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
399. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)). 
400. See Gertner, supra note 36, at 790 (“[T]he NAS Report’s concerns will not 
be fully met until advocacy changes.”); D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC 
Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010 
Utah L. Rev. 225, 242 (2010) (“Criminal defense lawyers . . . are supposed 
to be the people who recognize bogus expert claims, challenge them, move 
to get them excluded, and undermine those that survive exclusion by 
knowledgeable, thorough, and telling cross-examination. On the whole, they 
don’t do any of these things very well.”). 
401. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 102, at 89. 
402. Neufeld, supra note 25, at S110. 
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testimony. Better training for defense counsel—which is sorely  
needed—is not sufficient. Similarly, access to defense experts—also  
sorely needed—may not be adequate.403 Defense experts can challenge 
prosecution experts’ methods and opinions but do not have the funds 
to conduct foundational research, nor can they act as independent eval-
uators of foundational research on an ongoing basis.404 
An independent scientific review is required. NAS has published the 
most authoritative and independent reviews of forensic science. In addi-
tion to the forensic report, NAS issued reports on sound spectrometry 
(“voiceprints”),405 DNA profiling,406 polygraph testing,407 and bullet lead 
analysis.408 But NAS is not a governmental entity, and its work depends 
on outside funding. The justice system needs scientific expertise on a 
continuing basis—and thus institutionalized. 
The National Commission’s proposal, endorsed by PCAST, tasked 
NIST with the responsibility of evaluating forensic disciplines on an 
ongoing basis.409 It should be adopted. NIST has the expertise and 
independence for this task and has been increasingly involved in forensic 
research. There would be a cost, but litigating validity issues across the 
country at Daubert and Frye hearings also has a cost. Moreover, there 
 
403. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert 
Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 
(2004) (discussing the legal disputes over the scope of Ake—e.g., whether it 
applied to non-capital cases and to non-psychiatric experts). 
404. Although prosecutors are ethically obligated to avoid the use of flawed 
forensic testimony, the National District Attorneys Association recently 
asserted that bite mark evidence is a “reliable science”—an untenable 
position. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See generally Paul C. 
Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert 
Witnesses, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1493 (2007). 
405. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., On the Theory and 
Practice of Voice Identification (1979). 
406. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., The Evaluation of 
Forensic DNA Evidence (1996); National Research Council, Nat’l 
Acad. of Scis., DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992). 
407. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., The Polygraph and 
Lie Detection (2003). 
408. Nat’l Research Council, Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Forensic Analysis: 
Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (2004). 
409. In 2005, Peter Neufeld proposed an institute of forensic science. Neufeld, 
supra note 25, at S113. 
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is a significant expense associated with rectifying the past mistakes that 
occurred with hair,410 bullet lead,411 DNA,412 and arson cases.413 
Unfortunately, the current Attorney General did not renew the 
commission’s charter in April 2017.414 The independent scientists on the 
commission objected to this action, writing: 
The Justice Department now proposes to improve forensic science 
by moving its oversight and development to an office within the 
department. This is precisely the opposite of what was 
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences report and 
the NCFS. It is a step backwards, because it reinforces the 
conditions that contributed to the current problems, namely, 
placing this discipline within the control of law enforcement and 
prosecutors. The Justice Department is home to many dedicated 
public servants including scientists whose passion for justice is 
unquestioned. However, DOJ is not a scientific body, and it is 
difficult to see how forensic science can become a true science in 
 
410. See David R. Cameron, Forum: Review of FBI Lab Suggests Huge Number 
of Wrongful Convictions, New Haven Register (April 26, 2015, 5:24 PM), 
http://www.nhregister.com/opinion/article/Forum-Review-of-FBI-lab-sugges 
ts-huge-number-of-11353007.php [https://perma.cc/3NVM-2UN8] (“The FBI 
review has identified roughly 2,500 cases that fit those criteria. The review 
is still in its early stages; thus far, it has considered 268 trials involving 284 
defendants. It has found that lab examiners gave flawed testimony regarding 
the comparison of hairs in 257 of the 268 trials—more than 95 percent. 
Almost all of the examiners over that period—26 of 28—presented flawed 
testimony.”). 
411. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
412. See Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques 
Became Tainted, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-disputed-techniques. 
html [https://perma.cc/H46S-9AQF] (explaining that two controversial 
techniques have been discontinued); Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Notifies Crime 
Labs of Errors Used in DNA Match Calculations Since 1999, Wash. Post 
(May 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-notifies-
crime-labs-of-errors-used-in-dna-match-calculations-since-1999/2015/05/29/ 
f04234fc-0591-11e5-8bda-c7b4e9a8f7ac_story.html?utm_term=.2eed2704c8 
35 [https://perma.cc/GUZ3-VC4E] (“The FBI has notified crime labs across 
the country that it has discovered errors in data used by forensic scientists 
in thousands of cases to calculate the chances that DNA found at a crime 
scene matches a particular person, several people familiar with the issue 
said.”). 
413. See supra Section 2.C. 
414. See Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science 
Commission, Suspend Review Policy, Wash. Post (April 10, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-
to-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-review-policy/2017/04/10/2dad 
a0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.f2d36117b56d 
[https://perma.cc/XH7V-ZFWG]. 
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that environment. Science flourishes when free and independent; 
only then can the tools and technology that it creates be truly 
reliable.415 
The AAAS concurred, also stressing that independence “cannot be 
overstated” and expressing concern about the “inherent conflict of in-
terest in having law enforcement overseeing the work of forensic labs 
on which police and prosecutors rely to win and defend convictions.”416 
The American Academy of Forensic Science also opposed the formation 
of an Office of Forensic Science within DOJ.417 Instead of heeding this 
advice, the Attorney General appointed a prosecutor instead of a sci-
entist to head the working group within the DOJ.418 
These recent events should be put in context. The 2009 NAS Report 
recommended the creation of an independent federal entity—the 
National Institute of Forensic Sciences—to oversee the field, including 
the establishment of a research agenda.419 If adopted, this proposal 
would have wrest control of forensic science from law enforcement. The 
report provided the following justification: Some federal entities were 
“too wedded” to the status quo and “have failed to pursue a rigorous 
research agenda to confirm the evidentiary reliability of methodologies 
used in a number of forensic science disciplines.”420 As a result, these 
 
415. Sunita Sah et al., We Must Strengthen the “Science” in Forensic Science, 
Sci. Am. (May 8, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/ 
we-must-strengthen-the-science-in-forensic-science/ [https://perma.cc/47Y 
F-479M]. 
416. Spencer S. Hsu, Science Organizations Renew Call for Independent U.S. 
Committee on Forensics, Wash. Post (June 29, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/science-organizations-renew-call-for-
independent-us-committee-on-forensics/2017/06/28/3ab8cdea-5b6a-11e7-9b7 
d-14576dc0f39d_story.html?utm_term=.802de0997045 
[https://perma.cc/X46C-SY6U]. 
417. Betty Layne DesPortes, Message from the AAFS President, Am. Acad. 
of Forensic Scis. (April 3, 2017), https://news.aafs.org/presidents-
message/message-from-the-aafs-president-april-2017/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4T3K-34HA]. 
418. See Pema Levy, Sessions’ New Forensic Science Adviser Has a History of 
Opposing Pro-Science Reforms, Mother Jones (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:38 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2017/08/sessions-new-forensic-
science-adviser-has-a-history-of-opposing-pro-science-reforms/ [https://perma. 
cc/HAX9-QQDY] (“Attorney General Jeff Sessions has resisted efforts to 
rein in forensic science and hold it to higher standards. And this week, he 
appointed a senior adviser on forensics who has a history of opposing reforms 
that would bring more accountability and scientific rigor to forensic crime 
labs and expert testimony.”). 
419. NAS Forensic Report, supra note 26, at 19 (Recommendation 1(c): 
“promoting scholarly, competitive peer-reviewed research and technical 
development in the forensic science disciplines”). 
420. Id. at 18. 
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“agencies are not good candidates to oversee the overhaul of the forensic 
science community . . . .”421 There is little question that the NAS was 
referring to National Institute of Justice and the FBI Laboratory. The 
report noted that, although both had provided “modest leadership” in 
forensic science, “neither entity has recognized, let alone articulated, a 
need for change or a vision for achieving it.”422 Consequently, “advanc-
ing science in the forensic science enterprise is not likely to be achieved 
within the confines of DOJ.”423 In fact, law enforcement had manipu-
lated science in the past by shaping the research agenda, limiting access 
to data, attacking experts who disagreed with its positions, and “spin-
ning” negative reports.424 
When Congress did not authorize the creation of the National 
Institute of Forensic Sciences, DOJ, to its credit, established the NCFS. 
Most importantly, independent scientists were appointed to the com-
mission.425 Placing science back under the DOJ now is a major and 
unjustified retreat. 
Conclusion 
This Article explained how the judiciary’s failure to fulfill its gate-
keeper role can be traced back to its refusal to demand and properly 
evaluate foundational research—i.e., Daubert’s first factor, empirical 
testing. This failure has been systemic. Flawed forensic techniques such 
as bite mark analysis, microscopic hair comparisons, arson evidence, 
and comparative bullet lead analysis were routinely admitted into evi-
dence without foundational research. In addition, firearms, toolmark, 
and fingerprint examiners repeatedly presented overstated and mislead-
ing conclusions. This Article also argued that the justice system may 
be institutionally incapable of applying Daubert in criminal cases be-
cause it does not have access to independent scientific expertise on an 
ongoing basis, and endorsed the NCFS and PCAST recommendation 
that NIST should be tasked with this responsibility. 
Even if an independent scientific review is not institutionalized, 
PCAST, NCFS, and AAAS have provided guidance for courts dealing 
with admissibility challenges. First, the flawed techniques discussed in 
 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 16. The Report also stated: “Neither has the full confidence of the 
larger forensic science community. And because both are part of a 
prosecutorial department of the government, they could be subject to subtle 
contextual biases that should not be allowed to undercut the power of 
forensic science.” Id. 
423. Id. at 18. 
424. See Giannelli, supra note 201. 
425. Having served on the NCFS, the Author believes that there should have 
been more independent scientists on the Commission. 
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this Article should be excluded. If used at all, bite mark analysis should 
be limited to exclusions and perhaps to closed universe situations.426 For 
hair analysis, mitochondrial DNA analysis is far superior to microscopy. 
Arson evidence should comport with NFPA 921 and the AAAS report. 
As noted above, the FBI has abandoned comparative bullet lead 
analysis. 
Second, courts should focus, as Daubert requires, on foundational 
research. According to PCAST, “neither experience, nor judgment, nor 
good professional practices (such as certification programs and accred-
itation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes 
of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and 
reliability.”427 The NCFS concurred.428 
Third, subjective methods can be empirically tested. Such research 
has been conducted. PCAST identified studies in fingerprint and fire-
arms identification that meet stringent standards.429 These studies show 
an error rate, which should be presented to the jury.430 However, more 
than one study is needed. 
Fourth, in ruling on admissibility in firearms, toolmark, and finger-
print examination cases, courts should appreciate that there has been 
a “lost decade”—or two—during which rigorous research was not 
conducted.431 Instead, the disciplines examined in this article vigorously 
 
426. See, e.g., State v. Lambright, No. M2012-02538-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 
46839, at *6 (Jan. 7, 2014) (“Dr. Tabor said that, considering the number of 
teeth that the victim’s sister had, she would not have been capable of 
producing the bite mark found on the victim’s nose and upper lip. It was Dr. 
Tabor’s expert medical opinion that a two-year-old was not capable of 
producing the nature, severity, number, and orientation of bites sustained 
by the victim.”). 
427. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 6. 
428. See supra note 379 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of 
published peer review research). 
429. See supra note 367 and accompanying text (noting that closed-set studies 
are not sufficiently robust). 
430. If examiners claim that there is no error rate, they should be required to 
explain why not. See White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 19 
(“In testimony, examiners should always state clearly that errors can and do 
occur, due both to similarities between features and to human mistakes in 
the laboratory.”). 
431. This depends on when the clock started ticking. Daubert was decided in 1993. 
In 1995, the first challenge to handwriting testimony was decided. United 
States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). As noted above, 
the Williamson case on microscopic hair analysis was decided the same year. 
See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. Llera Plaza was decided in 
2002. See supra notes 312–315 and accompanying text (addressing the 
admissibility of fingerprint testimony). And Green was decided in 2005. See 
supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text (addressing firearms 
identification testimony). Moreover, during this period numerous courts 
restricted the use of handwriting identification. See, e.g., United States v. 
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resisted the views of independent scientists, and they were typically 
supported by prosecutors. For example, the wrongful execution of 
Cameron Todd Willingham, which triggered numerous scientific re-
views, was not enough to persuade the Texas Fire Marshal Office that 
its evidence was flawed,432 and it took a serendipitous event—the 
Madrid train bombing—to provoke fingerprint research. 
In short, forensic evidence is in a “Catch-22” situation: Only the 
federal government has the resources to fund the needed independent 
research, but it has no incentive to do so as long as evidence continues 
to be admitted without proper limitations. Until more scientifically 
sound studies are published and peer-reviewed by independent scien-
tists, courts should follow the approach adopted in United States v. 
Glynn,433 which permitted the expert to testify only that it was “more 
likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came from a 
particular weapon.434 
Fifth, the presentation of expert testimony needs to be controlled. 
Once again, PCAST made several recommendations, including: 
Statements suggesting or implying greater certainty are not 
scientifically valid and should not be permitted. In particular, 
courts should never permit scientifically indefensible claims such 
as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,” 
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent certainty” 
or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty;” 
identification “to the exclusion of all other sources;” or a chance 
of error so remote as to be a “practical impossibility.”435 
The NCFS also recommended against the use of the phrase 
“reasonable degree of scientific certainty”436 and the 2009 NAS report 
criticized the use of “zero error rates” and claims of infallibility.437 The 
recent AAAS fingerprint report found no scientific justification for 
statements of “identity” or “practical certainty” and cautioned against 
the use of terms such as “match,” “identification,” and “individual-
ization.”438 
 
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 73–74 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that expert 
testimony concerning the general similarities and differences between a 
defendant’s handwriting exemplar and a stick up note was admissible but 
not the specific conclusion that the defendant was the author). 
432. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
433. 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
434. Id. at 575. 
435. White House PCAST Report, supra note 38, at 19. 
436. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
437. See supra Section III.B.3. 
438. AAAS Fingerprint Report, supra note 39, at 11. 
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Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that examiners will 
give up their claims that there is a scientific foundation for their dis-
cipline. A subjective method without a meaningful protocol can hardly 
claim to be a science. This is not a new issue, as an editorial in the pres-
tigious scientific journal, Science, entitled “Forensic Science: Oxy-
moron?” and written by the editor-in-chief, made the same point fifteen 
years ago.439 Similarly, the 2009 NAS Report commented: “The law’s 
greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic evidence . . . concerns 
the question of whether, and to what extent, there is science in any 
given forensic science discipline.”440 After Daubert hearings, one court 
“very quickly concluded that whatever else ballistics identification anal-
ysis could be called, it could not fairly be called ‘science.’”441 The same 
is true of fingerprint examinations. 
Courts should also guard against attempts to introduce claims of 
“science” through the backdoor by means of circumlocutions such as 
statements that firearms and fingerprint identifications are subjective 
techniques that are “based on science.” This is misleading. Many things 
are “based on science”—e.g., riding a bike, throwing a curve ball, and 
flying a kite. 
Sixth, proficiency testing issues will continue to be litigated. These 
tests have long been suspect. They are not conducted blind and are not 
challenging.442 The President of Collaborative Testing Services told the 
 
439. See Kennedy, supra note 339 (discussing the cancellation of a National 
Academies project designed to examine various forensic science techniques, 
including fingerprinting, because the Departments of Justice and Defense 
insisted on a right of review that the Academy had refused to other grant 
sponsors). 
440. NAS Forensics Sciences Report, supra note 26, at 9. 
441. United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See also 
United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“[F]orensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification 
program, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after 
Daubert, be regarded as ‘scientific . . . knowledge.’”); id. at 1041 (“[W]hile 
scientific principles may relate to aspects of handwriting analysis, they have 
little or nothing to do with the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic 
Document Examiners]. . . . [T]his attenuated relationship does not transform 
the FDE into a scientist.”). 
442. For example, a fingerprint examiner from New Scotland Yard testified in 
one case that the FBI proficiency tests were deficient: “It’s not testing their 
ability. It doesn’t test their expertise. I mean I’ve set these tests to trainees 
and advanced technicians. And if I gave my experts these tests, they’d fall 
about laughing.” United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558 
(E.D. Pa. 2002). The district court agreed, noting that “the FBI examiners 
got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . . [O]n 
the present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less demanding 
than they should be.” Id. at 565. Similarly, in a trial involving handwriting 
comparisons, the court wrote: 
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NCFS “during its seventh meeting on August 10, 2015 that he has been 
under commercial pressure to make proficiency tests easier.”443 
 
There were aspects of Mr. Cawley’s testimony that undermined his 
credibility. Mr. Cawley testified that he achieved a 100% passage 
rate on the proficiency tests that he took and that all of his peers 
always passed their proficiency tests. Mr. Cawley said that his peers 
always agreed with each others’ results and always got it right. Peer 
review in such a “Lake Woebegone” environment is not meaningful. 
 United States v. Lewis, 220 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D.W. Va. 2002); see 
supra note 338 (discussing fingerprint proficiency testing). 
443. Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the Commission: Optimizing 
Human Performance in Crime Laboratories through Testing and 
Feedback (May 27, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/file/864776/ 
download [https://perma.cc/8BPS-DEER]). 
